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REGULATING OFF-LABEL INFORMATION
"We have met the enemy and he is us."
Walt Kelly, creator of Pogo.
I. INTRODUCTION
American pharmaceutical manufacturers are under siege. Even casual
observers of this sector recognize the severe challenges to the prevailing business
model: declining research productivity; heightened regulatory focus on safety
and comparative outcomes with a correspondingly low number of new product
approvals; decreasing market capitalization of mature companies; increasing
product liability claims; evolving price restraints in the face of increasing
managed care market power; and the looming uncertainty of the effects of federal
health care reform. But, in fact, the single greatest threat to the pharmaceutical
industry may be the policy environment within the United States, which is
restricting the ability of companies to speak truthfully with physicians about their
products.'
During the past decade drug companies have endured intrusive government
investigations of their business practices, particularly with respect to the
marketing and promotion of their products. Firms face extraordinary civil and
criminal liability if they discuss or otherwise attempt to influence prescribing
other than for the indications approved by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). There are now well more than one hundred ongoing civil
and criminal investigations involving the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and
units of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), as well as
associated investigations run by state attorneys general.2 Billions of dollars in
1. This article addresses the public policies associated with the regulation of pharmaceutical
manufacturers' communications with physicians. This includes discussions between field sales
representatives, who work for a manufacturer and seek to promote or "detail" the manufacturer's
product, and physicians and their office staff. This article is not concerned with so-called "direct to
consumer" advertising, in which manufacturers attempt to communicate directly with current or
prospective patients about the benefits of using a drug.
2. In a recent speech at the National Health Care Fraud Summit, U.S. Attorney General Eric
Holder noted that "[iun 2009, the Justice Department reached an all-time high in the number of
health care fraud defendants charged, more than 800. We also obtained more than 580 convictions.
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civil and criminal penalties have been paid to date for alleged wrongdoing, 3 and
And on the civil enforcement front, our health care fraud recoveries last year under the False
Claims Act exceeded a stunning $2.2 billion dollars." Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address at
the National Summit on Health Care Fraud (Jan. 28, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100128.html). See also infra note 21 and
accompanying text.
3. Publicly disclosed civil settlement and criminal plea agreements have outlined in great
detail allegations against nearly all of the major pharmaceutical companies, including Abbott
(which paid $622 million in 2003 to settle a federal investigation into its sales and marketing
practices), AstraZeneca ($355 million in 2003 and $520 million in 2010), Bayer ($97.5 million in
2008), Bristol-Myers Squibb ($499 million in 2006), Cephalon ($425 million in 2007), Eli Lilly
($1.415 billion in 2009), Merck ($670 million in 2008), Pfizer ($2.3 billion in 2009),
Pfizer/Wamer-Lambert ($430 million in 2004), Schering-Plough ($345 million in 2004), Serono
($704 million in 2005), and Takeda/Abbott Pharmaceuticals joint venture ($875 million in 2001).
See Gardiner Harris, Abbott To Pay $622 Million To End Inquiry Into Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 2003, at Cl; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP Pleads Guilty to
Healthcare Crime; Company Agrees To Pay $355 Million To Settle Charges (June 20, 2003),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/03 civ_371.htm; Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen.,
Remarks at the AstraZeneca Settlement Announcement (Apr. 27, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100427.html); Press Release, Dep't of Justice,
Bayer Healthcare To Pay U.S. $97.5 Million To Settle Allegations of Paying Kickbacks to Diabetic
Suppliers (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/08-civ-1050.html;
Barnaby J. Feder, Bristol Says U.S. Inquiry Is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2006, at Cl; Press
Release, Dep't of Justice, Biopharmaceutical Company, Cephalon, To Pay $425 Million & Enter
Plea To Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Marketing (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/
civil/ocl/cases/Cases/Cephalon/Cephalon%20Press%20Release.pdf, Press Release, Dep't of
Justice, Eli Lilly and Company Agrees To Pay $1.415 Billion To Resolve Allegations of Off-label
Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/civil/ocllcases/Cases/EliLilly/
Lilly/o20Press%20Release%2OFinal%2009-civ-038.pdf, Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Merck
Agrees To Pay $399 Million To Resolve Allegations of Improper Medicaid Billing and Improper
Inducements to Healthcare Professionals (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News
/Pr/2008/feb/steinkrelease.pdf; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces
Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History (Sept. 2, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/Press%200ffice%20-%2OPress%2ORelease%20Files/
Pfizer/Pfizer/20-%20PR%20%28Final%29.pdf; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Warner-Lambert
To Pay $430 Million To Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label
Promotion (May 13, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04 civ 322.htm; Press
Release, Dep't of Justice, Schering-Plough To Pay $345 Million To Resolve Criminal and Civil
Liabilities for Illegal Marketing of Claritin (July 30, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/
July/04_civ_523.htm; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Serono To Pay $704 Million for the Illegal
Marketing of AIDS Drug (Oct. 17, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/October/
05_civ_545.html; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc. and Seven
Others Charged with Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees To Pay $875 Million To Settle
X:2 (2010)
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REGULATING OFF-LABEL INFORMATION
many billions more surely will be paid in the coming years, on top of the costs of
the investigations themselves and the potential further liability that may stem
from related private class actions brought by plaintiffs' counsel. The concomitant
media and political scrutiny has irreparably harmed the reputation of the
industry.4 If the history of Western civilization may be seen as one long battle
pitting order against freedom, the government's effort to curtail off-label speech
might be dismissed as a minor skirmish on the outskirts of town. However, this
issue is anything but minor in policy terms. The eventual outcome will have
significant implications for the practice of medicine, the development of new
drugs, and the public health.
Physicians may prescribe FDA-approved drugs and biological products for
any therapeutic use that is appropriate in their medical judgment.5 While the
prevalence of off-label prescribing is difficult to estimate, there is little doubt that
in oncology6 and pediatrics 7 off-label prescribing is exceedingly common. Off-
Charges (Oct. 3, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2001/October/5I3civ.htm.
4. A recent survey indicated that the industries that the greatest numbers of people believe
should be "more regulated" are oil, pharmaceutical and drug, health insurance, managed care, and
tobacco companies. THE HARRIS POLL, BANKS SEEN AS NEEDING MORE REGULATION FOR SECOND
YEAR 1 (2009), available at http://news.harrisinteractive.com/profiles/investor/NewsPDF.asp
?b=1963&ID=34987&m-rl.
5. The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not limit the manner in which a physician may
use an approved drug. Once a product has been approved for marketing, a physician may
prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens or patient populations that are not included
in approved labeling. Such "unapproved" or, more precisely, "unlabeled" uses may be
appropriate and rational in certain circumstances, and may, in fact, reflect approaches to
drug therapy that have been extensively reported in medical literature.
Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled Indications, 12 FDA DRUG BULL. 4 (1982).
6. See Am. Soc'y of Clinical Oncology, Reimbursement for Cancer Treatment: Coverage of
Off-Label Drug Indications, 24 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3206, 3206 (2006); see also Daniel B.
Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Do Off-Label Drug Practices Argue Against FDA Efficacy
Requirements?, 67 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 743 (2008) (for a recent survey of physician perspectives
on the arguably anomalous dichotomy that exists between the FDA's regulation of unapproved
products and the absence of regulation of unapproved indications or uses of approved products);
Bryan Cote, Compendia: The Bridge Between FDA Approved Indications and Off-Label Usage,
ONCOLOGY BUS. REv., Jan. 2008, at 10, 11, available at http://www.oncbiz.com/
documents/OBR_0 108_Compendia.pdf (estimating that approximately 60% of cancer drugs are
used off-label); Richard A. Epstein, Cancer Patients Deserve Faster Access to Life-Saving Drugs,
WALL ST. J., May 2-3, 2009, at A 1l.
7. See Alicia T. F. Bizzano et al., Off-Label Prescribing to Children in the United States
Outpatient Setting, 9 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 81 (2009).
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label prescribing often is driven by factors beyond the control of the
manufacturer, 8 such that in some therapeutic areas off-label uses are the
customary, preferred treatments and are publicly declared to be such on patient
advocacy group websites and elsewhere.9 Some arms of the government, such as
the military, actively encourage off-label use by purchasing and providing drugs
specifically intended for off-label use.10 Moreover, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) authorize government reimbursement of products for
off-label uses based upon the submission by manufacturers of medical
information about such use.1 ' Indeed, many drugs appear to have legitimate off-
label uses that only become evident over time through physician practice and
post-approval clinical studies.1
2
Off-label prescribing1 3 has engendered passionate debate in recent years.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 109, 110, 113, 116, and 118.
9. Even though no drugs have been expressly approved for the treatment of multiple sclerosis
(MS)-related fatigue, Cephalon's Provigil (modafinil) is one of the "medications commonly used in
the treatment of MS," according to the National Multiple Sclerosis Society. The MS Society's
website notes that the clinical experience of some physicians treating patients with MS has shown
"significant benefit [of Provigil] for many patients with MS-related fatigue." National Multiple
Sclerosis Society, About MS, http://www.nationalmssociety.org/about-multiple-sclerosis/what-we-
know-about-ms/treatments/medications/modafinil/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
10. For example, the U.S. military conducted a number of clinical studies examining aviator
performance and pilot sustained alertness while taking Provigil (modafinil). See Memorandum
from the U.S. Dep't of the Air Force (Dec. 2, 2003) (stating that "[m]odafinil, a 'Go Pill', is now
approved for management of aircrew fatigue"), available at http://www.hep.afrl.af.mil/HEPF/
Policy/modafinil.pdf.
11. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHARTER: MEDICARE EVIDENCE DEVELOPMENT &
COVERAGE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
FACA/Downloads/medcaccharter.pdf.
12. See discussion of Cephalon's Provigil (modafinil) in text associated with footnotes 101-
108.
13. The term "off-label" includes new, un-FDA-approved indications or uses for a product,
potential side effects or safety concerns, dosing regimens to enhance efficacy in certain
circumstances, or any other product-related information that was not known or fully developed and
appreciated at the time of product approval. See generally Scott D. Danzis, Off-Label
Communications and Prescription Drugs, in ETHICS AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 184
(Michael A. Santoro & Thomas M. Gorrie eds., 2005). "Off-label use may originate from a
presumed drug class effect, extension to milder forms of an approved indication, extension to
related conditions (the use of the antiasthmatic montelukast [Singulair] for chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease), expansion to distinct conditions sharing a physiological link (the use of the
antidiabetic drug metformin to treat polycystic ovarian syndrome), or extension to conditions
whose symptoms overlap with those of an approved indication." Randall S. Stafford, Regulating
Off-Label Drug Use-Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. I. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008).
X:2 (2010)
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Some have suggested that the government adopt policies to limit physician
prerogative to prescribe for unapproved uses. They argue that, at least in certain
cases, the risks associated with off-label prescribing are unacceptable, and that
the integrity of the drug regulatory system is undermined if there are effectively
two different regimes under which some uses are authorized only after rigorous
testing and approval while others are wholly unregulated. 14 Others fear that
increased scrutiny would signal a marked shift toward federal oversight, away
from the longstanding practice of state regulation of the practice of medicine. 
15
Indeed, some have said that off-label prescribing should be encouraged to
advance public health in the face of a moribund agency approval process that is
underfunded, overwhelmed, and incapable of timely reviewing and approving
new indications at a pace consistent with medical developments.' 6 Regardless of
one's perspective, it is undeniable that off-label prescribing is a critical
component of the practice of medicine in America. 17
Yet under current law, drug manufacturers may not promote their products
for off-label uses. The enforcement of off-label promotion restrictions has
precipitated far more controversy and consternation than off-label prescribing.
Although the commercial motivations of drug manufacturers are readily
apparent, some believe there is no need to restrict off-label promotion as
manufacturers ultimately are deterred from advertising off-label uses by the
threat of substantial tort liability for misrepresentation and harm to patients.
Others point out that while labeling may be amended to include new information
about a drug, invariably there will be occasions in which the company is in
possession of truthful, non-misleading scientific and medical information that
14. See Muriel R. Gillick, Controlling Off-Label Medication Use, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED., 344, 345-46 (2009) (arguing that the costs and risks inherent in prescribing certain
biotechnology products suggest the government should limit physicians' discretion to prescribe off-
label and instead apply the national cost determination method used by the CMS); see also Rebecca
Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened Professional and Government
Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476 (2009).
15. See Federation of State Medical Boards, FSMB Mission, Vision, Core Values and Goals,
http://www.fsmb.org/mission.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (providing background information
on the state regulation of physicians in the United States).
16. At least one former senior FDA official contends that the agency cannot possibly approve
proposed modifications to existing labeling, let alone keep labeling current on all approved
products, at the pace required to keep up with scientific advances and changes in medical practice.
See Scott Gottlieb, Stop the War on Drugs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2007, at A21.
17. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFF-LABEL DRUGS: INITIAL RESULTS OF A NATIONAL
SURVEY 22, 23-26 (Feb. 1991), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc
?AD=ADA270395&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.
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will not be included in the current, approved labeling.18 The most extreme
position contends that the current ban on off-label promotion should be modified
substantially or even scrapped, since it significantly increases the cost of drug
development, inhibits the rate of adoption of effective new uses of approved
products, and limits the full dissemination to prescribing physicians of useful
medical information 9 Others contend that restricting off-label promotion
ensures public safety by preventing pharmaceutical companies from spreading
false or misleading information about their products in the pursuit of profits.2 °
These perspectives and practices serve to demarcate the wide bounds of a
vigorous policy debate over the significance and validity of truthful medical and
scientific information that is not included in the FDA-approved label.
Notwithstanding this backdrop of widespread, prevailing medical practice and
the importance of new medical and scientific information, the FDA and the DOJ
have increased dramatically their enforcement activities in this area, and
apparently will continue to do so in the coming years.21 What should we make of
18. See infra text accompanying notes 97-100.
19. See Alexander T. Tabarrok, Assessing the FDA via the Anomaly of Off-Label Drug
Prescribing, 5 INDEP. REV. 25, 26-27 (2005), available at http://www.independent.org/
pdf/tir/tir_05_1_tabarrok.pdf.
20. See Stafford, supra note 13; see also Donna T. Chen et al., US. Physician Knowledge of
the FDA-Approved Indications and Evidence Base for Commonly Prescribed Drugs: Results of a
National Survey, 18 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 1094 (2009).
21. See Mike Scarcella, DOJ Readying Fraud Attack, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10, 2009, at 1; see also
Carrie Johnson, A Backlog of Cases Alleging Fraud: Whistle-Blower Suits Languishes at Justice,
WASH. POST, July 2, 2008, at Al (reporting that over 900 cases are pending with about one-half
concerning health care companies); John R. Wilke, Cases, Fines Soar in Fraud Probes of Drug
Pricing, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2005, at Al (quoting then Assistant Attorney General Peter Keisler to
the effect that there were then more than 150 outstanding investigations involving approximately
500 products); Michael K. Loucks, First Assistant U.S. Attorney, Address from the 2007 Medical
Device Congress: Trends in Prosecutions and So-Called Off-Label Promotion Issues (Nov. 26,
2007) (PowerPoint presentation accompanying comments available at http://www.ehcca.com/
presentations/pharmaaudio20071126/loucks.pd). In the presentation, Mr. Loucks summarized
various factors that he examines in determining whether a prospective case brought to the attention
of his office might be worth further inquiry, including the extent of the total product market for
FDA-approved uses; whether sales representatives promote the product to physicians who do not
treat patients having the FDA-approved condition; whether the company otherwise "targets" such
doctors by paying bonuses to sales representatives that take into account sales outside of the FDA-
approved uses; or whether such sales are included in company annual objectives. In summary, any
drug that has apparent off-label utility could trigger an investigation. This perspective led a leading
health care lawyer to observe, "I don't think that a company that has legitimate off-label sales has a
safe harbor anymore." Michael McCaughan, Off-Label Sales in Jeopardy: Rx Industry Fights for
Clarity, RPM REP., Dec. 2007, at 4, 13 (quoting Scott Bass, Sidley Austin LLP).
X:2 (2010)
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this phenomenon? Where off-label prescribing is ineffective or ill-advised, the
FDA has a legitimate, compelling interest in protecting the public health by
ensuring that companies do not transmit false or misleading information, or
otherwise encourage off-label prescribing when there is no underlying medical
basis. But where the challenged off-label information is truthful, what is the
public interest in forbidding it? The billions of dollars in corporate fines flowing
into government coffers or absorbed by legal fees, which might otherwise be put
to good use in discovering new medicines, compel us to question the wisdom of
government policy in this area. What regulatory scheme will best ensure that
physicians are fully informed, yet minimize the potential for exaggeration or
embellishment so that the public health is not harmed? How should government
regulators best respect the recognized constitutional rights of companies to speak
truthfully about their medical discoveries, while ensuring that they speak
accurately and fairly?
This article contends that the government's de facto policy of limited
rulemaking and broad enforcement by threat of criminal prosecution is not the
optimal way in which to develop an appropriate regulatory equilibrium: ideally,
one that is efficient, effective, and equitable. The article begins with a summary
of the law and public policy concerning off-label prescribing and promotion in
the United States. After a brief discussion of the regulatory norms that judges and
scholars have long recommended as important in establishing an appropriately
balanced regulatory enforcement framework, it evaluates the current regulatory
environment in the United States and concludes that there are significant
deficiencies related to the absence of clarity, transparency, judicial review, and
policy congruity. The article then presents several product-specific case studies
that illustrate especially anomalous outcomes or challenging quandaries
engendered by prevailing government policy. Following this critique of U.S.
policy, the article summarizes the alternative approach of self-regulation now
prevailing in the United Kingdom. Finally, it considers which model is likely to
be more effective in facilitating appropriate, ethical business behavior by
industry, and to that end it makes a number of policy recommendations for
changes in U.S. regulatory policy and practice. The animating theme of this
article and its policy recommendations is that while pharmaceutical companies
have a profoundly important duty to act in a manner that is medically and
ethically appropriate, communicating truthful, non-misleading scientific and
medical information supports sound medical practice and should not subject
companies to civil or criminal liability.
22
22. To be clear, this article is not primarily about commercial free speech and the tension
between the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and FDA regulations that limit companies
9
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In considering this subject, I am reminded of the stone statue at the apex of
the Federal Triangle district in Washington, D.C. The statue is meant to portray a
heroic figure-government authority-who restrains with every ounce of
strength a wild stallion-unbridled capitalism-poised to break free at any
moment and gallop down the boulevard. Unquestionably, there is a vital role for
government in preventing the worst excesses of business, but where is the line
across which excess occurs; who should make the determination; and what
should be the penalty for crossing that line?
II. REGULATING OFF-LABEL SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL INFORMATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A CONCISE HISTORY
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, as amended (the "FDCA" or the
"Act") 23 provides the statutory framework under which the FDA regulates the
sale and marketing of drugs in the United States. The Act does not address
directly the communication of off-label information. Instead, a series of statutory
provisions, as interpreted by the FDA, serve to proscribe off-label promotion and
marketing. Specifically, the Act grants the FDA substantial authority to
determine the safety and efficacy of all "new" drugs prior to marketing, and to
regulate a new drug's proposed "labeling" to ensure that it is not false or
misleading.24 Labeling is defined under the Act to include all tangible material
that accompanies a drug.25 Once a drug has been approved by the FDA, the Act
specifies that the drug's labeling may not "suggest" that it be used for any new
condition that has not been approved by the FDA.26 FDA regulations restrict
company activities in this area to a much greater extent than the FDCA's
statutory scheme. For example, the FDA defines "labeling" to include virtually
anything that a company or its employees might produce or present, 2 even if the
material in question does not accompany the drug. As such, the Act's prohibition
of false or misleading labeling is transformed by the agency into an effective
prohibition on any advertisement, promotional message, or discussion that is not
"consistent with" the approved product labeling,28 or otherwise concerns any use
from communicating truthful and non-misleading scientific and medical information. Much has
been written on this subject, and although the commercial free speech issue is relevant here, the
primary focus of this article concerns regulatory policy.
23. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2006).
24. § 352(a).
25. § 321(m), (p).
26. §§ 32 1(p), 355(a), (b), (j). The agency also must approve any new uses prior to marketing
by the company.
27. Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2009).
28. The FDA interprets its various regulations to prohibit any communication to physicians or
X:2 (2010)
10
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 10 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol10/iss2/2
REGULATING OFF-LABEL INFORMATION
that has not been approved expressly by the FDA,29 regardless of whether it is
truthful or accurately reflects good medical practice.
The FDCA also makes it a crime to introduce into interstate commerce a
drug that is "misbranded." The Act defines misbranding as making false or
misleading statements in the labeling, or failing to include in the labeling
"adequate directions for use.",30 This regulation makes eminent sense on its face;
if a manufacturer includes demonstrably false information in the label, it
certainly is mislabeled or "misbranded" in common parlance. However, FDA
regulations have extended this seemingly straightforward statutory provision by
introducing the concept of "intended use." A manufacturer's intended use
includes all uses objectively intended by the drug manufacturer based upon
statements made in labeling, in advertisements, or in written or oral statements by
company representatives, and if the FDA-approved labeling does not cover each
"intended use" then a drug also is deemed to be misbranded.3
The collective effect of these regulations is as follows: a drug is approved by
the FDA for a specific use; if there is to be a new intended use or if the intended
other health care providers by drug company representatives of information that is not "consistent
with" the approved product labeling. See FDA Response to Comments on Final Guidance on
Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64074, 64085 (Dec. 3,
1997) ("Under the act, the regulated industry cannot promote its products for unapproved uses,
or... in ways not consistent with approved labeling."); see also FDA Warning Letter from Thomas
W. Abrams, Dir., Div. of Drug Mktg., Adver. & Commc'n, FDA, to Cary Rayment, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Alcon, Inc. (Oct. 20, 2006) available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnfonrmation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/
WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm053637.pdf; FDA
Warning Letter from Michelle Safarik & Jialynn Wang, Regulatory Review Officers, Div. of Drug
Mktg., Adver. & Commc'n, FDA, to Elizabeth M. Zola, Assoc. Dir., Regulatory Affairs, Ross
Products Div., Abbott Laboratories (July 15, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WamingLettersa
ndNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm054809.pdf; FDA Warning Letter
from Thomas W. Abrams, Dir., Div. of Drug Mktg., Adver. & Commc'n, FDA, to Adrain Adams,
President, Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (July 13, 2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WamingLettersa
ndNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/UCM 166441.pdf.
29. As suggested above, this broad prohibition is not set forth in any single regulation, but
effectively stems from reading the combination of 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006) (requiring that the
FDA approve a product and its labeling prior to introducing it into interstate commerce) and the
regulation found at 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4) (limiting the marketing and promotion of drugs in a
manner inconsistent with their approved uses).
30.21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1) (2006).
31.21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2009).
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use otherwise changes, then a manufacturer must demonstrate safety and efficacy
for that new intended use and obtain FDA approval for modified labeling that
properly reflects this new intended use; if a manufacturer provides information to
physicians or other health care providers that is not consistent with the existing,
approved product labeling, then the manufacturer has established a new intended
use without obtaining FDA approval, and therefore is unable to provide to
physicians and consumers the requisite instructions for using the product for this
unapproved indication; the company therefore has violated the law by
introducing a "misbranded" product into interstate commerce. Many regard this
interpretation as awkward at best and untenable at worst.
32
A company may be liable not only under the FDCA but also under the
federal False Claims Act (FCA).33 The FCA makes it unlawful to file a false
claim with the government, or to make a false statement that leads to making a
false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the government.34 Liability under
the FCA is determined on the basis of the labeling in effect at the time the off-
label speech occurs. This appears to be the case even if the information is
truthful, and even if the FDA subsequently approves the promoted indication.
The interpretation and application of the FCA to off-label promotion challenges
are particularly interesting as they go directly to the relevance of the truthfulness
of the medical or scientific information: drug companies do not themselves file
claims for payment with the government; instead, manufacturers sell their
32. In fact, the actual labeling may be entirely accurate with respect to the directions of use for
the product as it is commonly used, but manufacturers may be charged with misbranding if they are
aware of substantial off-label use, and are unable to unilaterally modify the labeling to correct the
situation. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10-11,
Allergan, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-1879 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2009). But see Smoking Everywhere,
Inc. v. U.S. FDA, No. 09-771, -- F. Supp. 2d -- , 2010 WL 129667, at *9 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2010)
(rejecting the FDA's contention that product testimonials established the manufacturer's broader
intended use to treat nicotine withdrawal symptoms, when the overwhelming focus of the
promotional materials was to support the use of the product only as a nicotine substitute).
33. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006). The False Claims Act imposes liability of three times the
government's loss plus civil penalties for each false claim presented. In response to evidence of
substantial fraud in defense contracting, health care, and other areas involving government
payments, Congress in 1986 modified a Civil War-era statute to enhance the law's whistleblower-
or qui tam-features. In so doing, Congress enabled citizens with evidence of fraud with respect to
government contracts and programs to sue, on behalf of the government, in order to recover the
funds. As an incentive to file a qui tam case, the citizen whistleblower or "relator" may be awarded
a portion of the funds recovered, typically between 15-25%. A qui tam suit initially remains under
seal for at least sixty days during which time government determines whether to join the action. 31
U.S.C. § 3730 (2006).
34. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2).
X:2 (2010)
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products to wholesale distributors, who in turn sell to pharmacies and other
providers, who in turn file claims with the government. Therefore, one might
reasonably conclude that liability under the FCA for drug manufacturers would
follow only if they make a false statement. However, at least one federal court
has found otherwise, ruling that a violation of the FDCA for off-label promotion
is sufficient to establish liability under the FCA, whether or not the underlying
promotional statements were false.35
This regulatory framework establishes the FDA's fundamental authority in
determining the flow of information from drug companies to physicians and
patients.36 But this authority is not unlimited. The Washington Legal Foundation
cases of the late 1990s 37 established that the Constitution limits the FDA's ability
to control the dissemination of truthful, non-misleading scientific and medical
35. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001). The
court's ruling that the FCA does not require both a false statement and a false claim also is
significant for construction of the statute. But see infra text accompanying note 88.
36. In the early 1990s, it was common to hear drug company executives say to the firm's
commercial group (without a trace of shame or irony): "If you don't get one or two warning letters
a year, then you really aren't doing your job." It is difficult to imagine that FDA officials were
unaware of this cavalier attitude, and over time it seems they became determined to do something
about it. Many observers trace the heightened attention on the problems of off-label promotion to
the reign of former FDA Commissioner, Dr. David A. Kessler, who was appointed to the post in
1991. During his time at the agency, he opposed legislation that would have modified labeling for
an approved product if a particular off-label use was common practice among clinicians for at least
five years, and he generally expressed concerns about physician prescribing decisions that were
based on anecdotal experience. See Protecting and Promoting Public Health: Hearing on S. 1477
Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Dr. David
A. Kessler, Comm'r, FDA), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/
ucml15101.htm. These sentiments may have influenced many of those still at the agency or
working in policy positions in HHS. Regardless, the FDA's focus on preserving its institutional
prerogatives is evident in multiple court filings and public statements. Agency officials have made
clear that they are extremely reluctant to acknowledge the truthfulness of safety and efficacy claims
without final approval to that effect, and that, in its view, manufacturer dissemination of off-label
information is "inherently misleading," even though that same information is not misleading when
others do the disseminating. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 67 (D.D.C.
1998), vacated on other grounds, Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
However, courts have not always agreed. "In asserting that any and all scientific claims about the
safety, effectiveness, contraindications, side effects, and the like regarding prescription drugs are
presumptively untruthful or misleading until the FDA has had the opportunity to evaluate them,
FDA exaggerates its overall place in the universe." See id.
37. See Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 51; Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 128 F. Supp. 2d 11
(D.D.C. 2000), dismissed and vacated inpart, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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information, at least in the form of peer-reviewed journal articles, medical
textbooks, and sponsorship of continuing medical education programs. In this
line of cases, an FDA guidance that would have limited the dissemination of
peer-reviewed journal articles and medical textbook reprints (so-called enduring
materials) were struck down as an unconstitutional infringement of commercial
free speech under the Supreme Court's test articulated in Central Hudson v.
Public Service Commission of New York.38 Subsequently, the FDA avoided a
permanent injunction against enforcement of the guidance by stipulating that the
ruling merely established "safe harbors" under which manufacturers could be
assured that their activities would not be challenged, and that "nothing in [the
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA)] provides
the FDA with independent authority to regulate manufacturer speech.,
39
Despite the agency's wide authority, some critics have faulted the FDA for
failing to more aggressively enforce the off-label promotion rules and limit
abuses by drug manufacturers. 40 Consequently, the government has increased
significantly the number of enforcement actions in this area in recent years,
which may be traced to a seminal case involving the Parke-Davis unit of Warner
Lambert and its drug Neurontin (gabapentin). Neurontin was approved by the
FDA in 1994 as an adjunctive treatment for seizures associated with epilepsy.
However, Parke-Davis was accused of developing and executing a promotional
campaign to spur prescriptions for the treatment of pain and a series of
psychiatric disorders, including anxiety and depression. To accomplish this,
Parke-Davis employed a legion of technical medical writers who penned
prospective journal articles in support of the purported off-label utility, and then
paid physicians to put their names on the articles as authors. 41 Parke-Davis also
38. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In Central Hudson, the U.S. Supreme Court established a four-part
test to determine the constitutionality of allowing government regulation of commercial speech:
whether the commercial speech to be regulated is lawful and not misleading; whether there is a
substantial government interest at stake; if so, whether the proposed regulation advances the
asserted substantial government interest; and whether the proposed regulation is more extensive
than necessary to serve the interest. See id.
39. Henney, 202 F.3d at 336.
40. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA's OVERSIGHT OF THE
PROMOTION OF DRUGS FOR OFF-LABEL USES 16 (July 2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08835.pdf. This report found that between 2003 and 2007 the FDA
received approximately 277,000 submissions of promotional material as required under the law, but
the agency could not provide data on the number of pieces actually reviewed, the extent to which
they identified regulatory violations, the length of the review process, or the status of reviews. To
date, there is no systematic means by which the FDA determines which promotional pieces will be
reviewed thoroughly.
41. See Natasha Singer, Medical Papers by Ghostwriters Pushed Therapy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
X:2 (2010)
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hired "medical liaisons" as an adjunct sales force to solicit doctors to prescribe
off-label, one of whom subsequently brought a qui tam action against the
company alleging violations of the False Claims Act. Particularly damning were
excerpts from a sales presentation in which a manager equated off-label
prescriptions to "money," dismissed alleged safety concerns as unworthy of
consideration, and directed sales representatives to promote off-label. 42 Pfizer,
having acquired the Parke-Davis unit through its acquisition of Warner-Lambert,
eventually settled these allegations for $430 million.43 In this matter, the
government effectively announced" its intention to focus on off-label promotion
as a separate, actionable violation of the FDCA and the FCA. The case is
notorious in that its salacious details show the industry at its worst in employing
aggressive sales tactics and adopting marketing messages that diverge not only
4, 2009, at Al (regarding recent allegations related to this practice).
42. John Ford, a Parke-Davis marketing manager, reportedly encouraged the company's
medical liaisons to promote Neurontin for off-label uses for which there was no apparent scientific
or medical basis:
I want you out there every day selling Neurontin.... We can't wait for them to ask, we
need to get out there and tell them up front.... That's where we need to be, holding their
hand and whispering in their ear, Neurontin for pain, Neurontin for monotherapy,
Neurontin for bipolar, Neurontin for everything.
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION BY RELATOR DAVID P. FRANKLIN PURSUANT TO 31 U.S.C. § 3730 B(2),
11 (1996), available at http://dida.library.ucsf.edu/pdf/rab00al 0.
43. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Wamer-Lambert To Pay $430 Million To Resolve
Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13, 2004),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04-civ322.htm. In a more recent case, Eli Lilly was
accused of illegally promoting its drug Zyprexa (olanzapine). Zyprexa, the first in a new class of
so-called atypical antipsychotics, was approved by the FDA in 1996 for the treatment of
schizophrenia and in 2005 for the treatment of bipolar disorder. Following FDA approval of the
second indication, the record suggests that Eli Lilly shifted its marketing strategy such that its sales
representatives would indicate to general practitioners that Zyprexa was appropriate for elderly
patients suffering from depression or dementia. In announcing its settlement, the government
emphasized the primacy of the FDA's role, suggesting that any information provided by companies
outside of the FDA-approved message would necessarily "undermine the integrity of the doctor-
patient relationship and place innocent people in harm's way." Eli Lilly settled these allegations in
early 2009 for $1.415 billion. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company Agrees To
Pay $1.415 Billion To Resolve Allegations of Off-label Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/civiltocl/cases/Cases/Eli Lilly/Lilly/o20Press%2ORelease%2OFinal%2009-
civ-038.pdf.
44. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Warner-Lambert To Pay $430 Million To Resolve
Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion, supra note 43.
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from the information contained in the approved label, but also from established
medical science.
Since the Parke-Davis settlement, the federal government's policy in this
area has been that significant off-label prescribing will be regarded with
suspicion, and any discourse with physicians about pharmaceutical and biological
drug characteristics not included in the FDA-approved labeling will lead, at the
least, to a very intrusive and expensive investigation. Key government
prosecutors have confirmed that it does not matter whether or not the
questionable speech is truthful or misleading, so long as it is "off-label. ' ' 5
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY IDEAL AND REGULATORY NORMS
Government regulates the behavior of business by developing rules, and
then monitoring and enforcing compliance with those rules, preferably in a fair
and consistent manner.46 American courts acknowledge that agencies have broad
discretion to engage in ad hoc enforcement actions should they wish to make an
example of a firm or an industry in order to affect policy, but they also emphasize
the benefits inherent in the development of clear rules under a transparent
rulemaking process.47 In fact, courts have long preferred this extensive, explicit
45. When asked at an industry sponsored panel if he regards it significant that the off-label
information in question is truthful, Assistant U.S. Attorney Loucks replied: "I would say this from
an investigator's or prosecutor's perspective, I don't know that it matters much that the off-label
promotion activity might be entirely truthful and accurate, it's still off-label." Michael Loucks,
Assistant U.S. Att'y in the Dist. of Mass., National Pharma Audioconference: Lessons of Bristol
Myers-Squibb's $515 Million Settlement for Off-Label Promotion, Kickbacks and Drug Pricing
(Nov. 26, 2007) (transcript on file with author).
46. There is an extensive academic literature concerning the effectiveness of regulation and
choices involving rulemaking and enforcement. In a leading law and economics analysis, Fenn and
Veljanovski conclude that economic efficiencies result, and corresponding harm is minimized,
when government agencies use their discretion to negotiate with firms rather than applying across-
the-board enforcement sanctions. P. Fenn & C.G. Veljanovski, A Positive Economic Theory of
Regulatory Enforcement, 98 ECON. J. 1055 (1988); see also William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private
Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980); see generally A READER ON
REGULATION (Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott & Christopher Hood eds., 1998). Of course, rulemaking
and enforcement do not necessarily represent a choice of one form of regulation over another. By
definition, there must be rules before there can be enforcement, and even under the most elaborate
set of rules there will be those who do not adhere to them who must be subject to enforcement
actions as a result. In some areas of U.S. law (for example, securities law) there is relative emphasis
placed on clear articulation of rules, and in others there is relative emphasis on selective
enforcement.
47. See, e.g., Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C.
X:2 (2010)
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rulemaking process as one that at once is consistent with due process and rule of
law principles, and provides more effective notice to, and engagement with, the
regulated industry in question.48
An optimal regulatory regime is fair to the regulated parties, accomplishes
the government interests at stake while being sensitive to related legal and policy
interests, and minimizes the costs for government and industry. Scholars are
quick to praise those normative values that they believe to be associated with
proper rulemaking and enforcement, such as clarity, including what some have
referred to as accessibility (meaning that the rules are easily interpreted and
applied to concrete, real world situations without excessive difficulty or effort);
transparency of the rulemaking process; congruity of the rules with other, related
legal and regulatory policy preferences and values; and adherence to due process
principles, including notice to, and engagement with, the regulated party.4 9 On
this point, prominent regulatory theorists have proposed thinking about
regulation and optimal regulatory strategy as a cascading series of choices,
perhaps as a pyramid, where enforced self-regulation (industry rules with
government oversight) would be employed, and only where this approach has
failed demonstrably should government resort to state regulation with
discretionary or mandatory punishment.50
On the other hand, legal scholars and social scientists in Britain and America
have written extensively in recent years about the problems associated with rules
and rulemaking. In this regard, there is near unanimity that much of the trouble
lies in the challenge inherent in the ambiguity of the English language. 1 Beyond
Cir. 1993) (notice and comment to affected parties of proposed rules is preferable to "ad hocery" of
enforcement actions).
48. See, e.g., Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 969 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (arguing that the due process clause demands "that government articulate its
aims with a reasonable degree of clarity"); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) ("[T]he
agency must, at a minimum, let the standard be generally known so as to assure that it is being
applied consistently .... ); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (holding that the SEC may
pursue enforcement actions, but must allow for notice, participation, and transparency).
49. See generally ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY,
STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE (1999); BRONWEN MORGAN & KAREN YEUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND REGULATION: TEXT AND MATERIALS (2007); ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM
AND ECONOMIC THEORY (1994) (regarding normative values associated with rulemaking and
enforcement). On the importance of accessibility, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983).
50. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
51. Regulation can fail because of the nature of rules and the nature of language. JULIA BLACK,
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this, the American inclination for the heavy hand of law enforcement and
criminal sanction, combined with the prospective application of mandatory
exclusion from federal reimbursement programs, has fostered a regulatory
environment that largely fails to meet the critical norms praised by courts and
commentators.
IV. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
In the United States, the regulation of off-label medical and scientific
communication is inconsistent with the ideals outlined above. In recent
enforcement actions, the government has appeared unable or unwilling to
distinguish among lawful off-label prescribing by physicians, the communication
by companies to physicians and health care providers of truthful and non-
misleading speech, the communication by companies of false or misleading
information, and clear financial impropriety that may be associated with that
communication. Prosecutors have interpreted ambiguous rules to develop
innovative but untested legal theories to compel breathtaking settlements and
plea agreements. The political and legal dynamic at work here effectively ignores
important free speech rights that have been recognized by American courts and
the FDA, and threatens the prerogative of doctors to practice medicine by
limiting access to the most recent scientific and medical developments. Although
there are standards for determining whether corporate malfeasance should be
treated as a civil or criminal matter, the process is far from transparent and the
standards and associated calculation of financial penalties are not interpreted
consistently.
A. The Absence of Clear Rules
With so much at stake, the laws and regulations applicable to the promotion
and marketing of drugs and devices ought to be very clear. Companies
understand that drug advertisements and other promotional material and
statements must be truthful and not misleading. Company sales representatives
understand that they may not tell doctors that an approved drug is good for a
particular condition unless the FDA approves its use based upon the submission
of valid scientific and medical information.
RULES AND REGULATORS 5-45 (1997). "Transparency is usually bought at the price of incongruity.
.. . Diver, supra note 49, at 91. Diver suggests that the dilemma for the rule maker and the
enforcer is how best to strike the proper balance between specificity or transparency, and the
discretion that must be applied under varying factual circumstances to reach fair and consistent
enforcement. For a discussion of rules and their role in limiting government discretion, see ROBERT
BALDWIN, RULES AND GOVERNMENT (1995).
X:2 (2010)
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But beyond these broad guidelines, not much else is clear.52 Under current
FDA regulations and the agency's interpretation of them, it remains unclear
where to draw the line between impermissible off-label promotion and the
ostensibly permissible exchange of scientific information. One might say
ostensibly, because the FDA has acknowledged several well-known "exceptions"
over the years that allow manufacturers to speak about off-label use in certain
limited circumstances. For example, manufacturers commonly respond to
unsolicited requests for information on off-label uses from health care
professionals, 5 3 announce the results of clinical studies concerning a new use for
an approved drug,54 and provide financial support for scientific and educational
activities, provided that they do not influence the content of such activities. 55 Yet
the FDA has never outlined its perspective on these matters in a definitive,
comprehensive way. Moreover, at times the agency has suggested that it may not
continue to recognize these exceptions.56 The only certainty is that the FDA will
52. But see The View from FDA: An Interview with Robert Temple on Off-Label Promotion,
RPM REP., Dec. 2007 (quoting Dr. Robert Temple) ("No, I don't think [the rules are] confusing.
They're not always followed, but I don't think there's any confusion about it. Companies aren't
allowed to do it. It is as clear as it could be."). However, in the interview, Dr. Temple did
acknowledge some ambiguity and confusion related to companies' sponsorship of and influence
over content presented in medical education programs. Id.
53. See Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Policy on Promotion
of Unapproved Uses of Approved Drugs and Devices, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,823 (Nov. 18, 1994)
(indicating that FDA policy allows companies to disseminate information in response to unsolicited
requests).
54. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.2(a), 312.7(a), 812.7 (2009).
55. See Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,286 (Mar. 16,
2000) (stating that manufacturers may provide resources for continuing medical education if they
comply with statutory provisions).
56. In fact, some of the exceptions specified are not true "safe harbors" in that "[gluidance
documents do not establish legally enforceable rights or responsibilities." 21 C.F.R. § 10.1 15(d)(1)
(2009). The agency's perspective is evinced in its recent attempt to balance First Amendment and
public health concerns. See Guidance for Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of
Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New
Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices; Availability, 74 Fed. Reg.
1,694 (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/Regulatorylnformation/
Guidances/ucm125126.htm (Draft Guidance). (The author was a member of an industry working
group that advocated for the development and adoption of this guidance.) The Draft Guidance was
criticized by prominent members of Congress and consumer advocates for permitting companies to
distribute off-label information that will put "the public at risk for ineffective and dangerous uses of
drugs." Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform,
House of Representatives, to Andrew C. von Eschenbach, Comm'r, FDA (Nov. 30, 2007),
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consider company efficacy claims to be truthful and not misleading if they are
found to be such by the agency and are included in approved labeling.57
Even if the rules were comprehensive, practical, and clearly articulated, the
situation is complicated considerably by the potential application of the First
Amendment and its explicit protection of speech. However, following the
Washington Legal Foundation cases, no federal appellate court and very few
other federal district courts have had the occasion to opine on the question of
whether the FDA's policy of prohibiting the dissemination of truthful, non-
misleading off-label scientific and medical information is unconstitutional. As
such, it is not clear whether the views set forth in the Washington Legal
Foundation cases will be adopted broadly, or whether the First Amendment will
be applied to protect other forms and manners of speech related to off-label
information.58
available at http://online.wsj.com!public/resources/documents/waxmanletter_1 13007.pdf.
The Draft Guidance also was criticized by industry for reneging on earlier "safe harbor"
commitments. See Letter from Daniel J. Popeo, Chairman, Wash. Legal Found., and Richard A.
Samp, Chief Counsel, Wash. Legal Found., to FDA (Apr. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/Reprints%20Guidance-%20WLF%20Comments.pdf. In its comments,
the Foundation criticized the agency for failing to address broadly the underlying First Amendment
commercial free speech prerogative. "It is inexplicable for FDA to be issuing a Draft Guidance in
this area without any explanation regarding what it views as the extent of manufacturers' First
Amendment rights." Id. at 5. Some of these criticisms were addressed by the FDA in the final
guidance. For example, although the Draft Guidance purported to offer manufacturers a bona fide
safe harbor for the dissemination of peer-reviewed journal articles, it limited its application to cases
where there has not been any unlawful promotion of the product. However, in the final guidance,
the agency modified its language; while it may challenge companies that promote illegally, it will
not hold companies responsible for the contemporaneous dissemination of journal articles. Finally,
the Draft Guidance required that any journal articles disseminated under the safe harbor be limited
to those that summarize "adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations." The FDA's final
guidance does not contain this limitation.
57. See Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or
Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or
Cleared Medical Devices; Availability, 74 Fed. Reg. 1,694. Some viewed the Draft Guidance as a
distinct "relaxation" of the prior level of FDA scrutiny of drug company promotion, especially in
comparison with the core principles of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997. This statute allowed
for dissemination of journal articles, but only where manufacturers were communicating about
drugs as to which they were seeking label expansion and had submitted the article to the agency in
advance. See Stafford, supra note 13, at 1429. Conversely, others noted that the guidance, even in
final form, was relatively narrow in that it only allowed the dissemination of materials that were
"written, edited, excerpted, or published specifically for, or at the request of' the manufacturer. See
supra Good Reprint Practices.
58. In United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Ill. 2003), the district court
X:2 (20 10)
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The quandary for industry executives and their counsel can be reduced to
one word: accessibility. The rules are not reasonably well appreciated and
susceptible to practical application. How should companies apply the broad
commandment that forbids off-label promotion to the daily routine of interacting
with prescribing physicians? Consider a few concrete business situations that
illustrate the inadequacy of current FDA rules and regulations: may sales
representatives present their message to any physician, so long as it is consistent
with the approved labeling, or must all physicians to whom the message is
presented have patients who suffer from the on-label indication? Is it "consistent
with" the approved labeling to discuss the likely mechanism of action of the
active compound if the mechanism is not disclosed in the labeling? May
companies sponsor what have been known as "independent" continuing medical
education programs, and if so how should they be structured? May a company
engage a physician as a bona fide consultant without being seen as improperly
influencing prescribing decisions, and if so how should it determine fair market
value compensation for the services rendered? May a company offer advice on
reimbursement for off-label uses, either to a physician, to a physician office staff,
considered whether the First Amendment shielded defendants from liability for promoting a
medical device in a form that had never been approved by the agency. In finding that it did not,
Judge Castillo distinguished Washington Legal Foundation by noting that the communication at
issue in that case was limited to the dissemination of peer-reviewed journal articles and the
sponsorship of continuing medical education programs, while accepting defendants' First
Amendment argument in Caputo would necessarily allow much greater leeway for manufacturers
to promote off-label. "[P]ermitting Defendants to engage in all forms of truthful, non-misleading
promotion of off-label use would severely frustrate the FDA's ability to evaluate the effectiveness
of off-label uses." Id. at 922. As another data point, Judge Saris of the U.S. District Court in Boston
had occasion in 2007 to express her views at a hearing in which the drug manufacturer Schering-
Plough Corporation was sentenced for violating the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act for, among other
things, promoting off-label and misleading the FDA. In contrast to Judge Castillo, Judge Saris
explicitly rejected the Washington Legal Foundation principles. "I do not accept that there is a First
Amendment right to market something that does not get FDA approval," she said. Michael K.
Loucks, First Assistant U.S. Attorney, Address from the 2007 Medical Device Congress: Trends in
Prosecutions and So-Called Off-Label Promotion Issues (Nov. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.ehcca.com/presentations/pharmaaudio20071126/loucks.pdf (quoting Judge Saris in
Schering Sales Corporation sentencing hearing). See also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535
U.S. 357 (2002) (ban on advertising of compounded drugs is unconstitutional because it did not
satisfy Central Hudson test); Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v.
Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting "unsettled" constitutional law, and
despite the fact that the speech in question was not inherently misleading, a pharmaceutical sales
representative is not entitled to dismissal on First Amendment grounds of case alleging FDCA
violations for "misbranding" based upon improper off-label promotion).
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to a private payer, or to a state pharmacy and therapeutics committee? May a
company express any level of ambition or prospect for an unapproved use lest it
be accused of embracing an off-label marketing strategy? FDA regulations
simply do not address these and other questions associated with the promotion
and sale of prescription pharmaceuticals.
Some cases are rather stark and unsympathetic. In the Neurontin matter,
there does not appear to be any valid contention that the company's sales and
marketing efforts were predicated on the communication of truthful, non-
misleading information that just happened to be outside the FDA-approved
labeling. Many cases are not so straightforward, however. The complexities of
medicine, health care practices, and the contemporary commercial enterprise
suggest that in many situations, FDCA violations may or may not have occurred
depending upon the subjective interpretation of myriad factors. The FDA has an
obligation to develop and promulgate comprehensive guidance on promotional
activities, medical education, and physician consulting engagements. Instead, the
agency has issued a series of warning letters in response to complaints and its
own observations as to apparent violations. The alleged infractions range from
the outrageous (lying about efficacy, denying safety issues) to the sublime (the
height or boldness of typefaces used in a marketing brochure makes it
misleading). The letters are specific to the facts of each case and are a poor
substitute for a general regulatory framework or code of conduct of the sort that
has been promulgated by other federal government agencies.59 Moreover, the
FDA's approach has facilitated a cynical approach by many companies that
choose to employ intellectual gymnastics to distinguish their practices from many
a narrowly crafted warning letter.
FDA warning letters would be more useful if they were issued with
reference to a broad but detailed code of conduct. For example, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC" or the "Commission")
promulgates detailed regulations and provides further guidance to companies on
disclosure issues through its "No Action" letters. No Action letters necessarily
are fact-specific as well, but they are intended to supplement a comprehensive
framework of securities laws, rules, and regulations. As the Commission notes:
An individual or entity who is not certain whether a particular product, service,
or action would constitute a violation of the federal securities law may request
a "no-action" letter from the SEC staff. Most no-action letters describe the
request, analyze the particular facts and circumstances involved, discuss
applicable laws and rules, and, if the staff grants the request for no action,
59. The FDA publishes its warning letters to the public. See U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, Warning Letters, http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/
default.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
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concludes that the SEC staff would not recommend that the Commission take
enforcement action against the requester based on the facts and representations
described in the individual's or entity's original letter. The SEC staff
sometimes responds in the form of a no-action letter to requests for clarification
of the legality of certain activities.
60
The FDA deserves credit for issuing its recent-albeit belated-guidance
which attempts to address in a comprehensive manner the practice of
disseminating reprinted articles from peer-reviewed journals.6' The agency has
characterized the guidance as the FDA's "current thinking" on the topic and
notes that the guidance was made necessary due to the expiration of Section 401
of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA),
which had previously provided a safe harbor for the industry on reprint
practices.62 However, unlike the previously existing FDA Notice clarifying that
FDAMA and its implementing regulations merely constituted a safe harbor,63 the
most recent guidance explicitly permits the dissemination of off-label scientific
and medical information under certain circumstances, regardless of whether the
company is pursuing a new indication and without requiring that companies
submit the material to be disseminated in advance for review.64 Many appreciate
the guidance as an initial, if halting, step toward enhanced regulatory clarity to
better guide industry practice, inform physicians, and enhance compliance.
B. The Lack of Transparency in the Rulemaking and Enforcement Process
In addition to enacting rules and regulations that are comprehensive and
reasonably clear, government should ensure that the process for both the adoption
and the enforcement of rules is transparent. The U.S. government has failed on
both accounts. In its adoption of rules and regulations, the FDA largely has failed
to address forthrightly the evident tension between the First Amendment and its
regulations proscribing the communication of truthful and non-misleading
information not contained in approved labeling. Moreover, as the DOJ has
assumed a higher degree of involvement in developing cases alleging civil and
60. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, No Action Letters, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/noaction.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
61. See Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or
Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or
Cleared Medical Devices; Availability, 74 Fed. Reg. 1,694.
62. See id.
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criminal violations under the FDCA and the FCA, the investigation,
consideration, and resolution of these cases also have become less transparent.
With respect to the development of rules, the FDA has shied away from
engaging in an open process in which it attempts to reconcile the competing
interests of commercial free speech and regulatory prerogative. Perhaps the best
example concerns the agency's response to the Washington Legal Foundation
65
opinions. The nearest the agency came to providing comprehensive rules on the
dissemination of off-label scientific and medical information was its 1996 policy
guidance, which sought to limit the use by companies of peer-reviewed journal
articles and medical textbooks.66 This guidance subsequently was found to be
unconstitutionally broad in a preliminary ruling issued by a federal district court
67ThFDin the Washington Legal Foundation cases. The FDA was presented with a
clear choice: it could have contested the ruling on appeal, or it could have
modified and reissued its guidance in reaction to the decision. As noted above,
until very recently the agency did neither, instead declaring that its guidance (as
well as similar statutory language) merely provided a safe harbor for
companies.68 As such, any failure by companies to follow the guidance was not
necessarily a violation of the law. However, the agency retained its general
authority under which it could challenge manufacturers. Absent the adoption of a
bona fide safe harbor for companies to rely upon in disseminating these kinds of
materials, manufacturers still face potential civil and criminal liability. In light of
this revised posture, the appellate court had no legal basis to provide its opinion
on the underlying question, thereby ensuring that the law in this area would
remain ambiguous. Based upon deposition and other testimony offered by FDA
officials in the course of the litigation, it seems evident that the agency was
displeased with the court's decision, yet there was no public attempt to address
the important policy issues raised by the case.
In 2002, shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Thompson v. Western
65. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 128 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2000), dismissed and
vacated in part, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
66. See Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct. 8, 1996).
67. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 72-74 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated on
other grounds, Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Wash. Legal Found.
v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999), dismissed and vacated in part, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
68. See Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,286. The FDA
subsequently published a Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues several years after the
Washington Legal Foundation cases concluded, and though it received numerous comments it has
not yet taken action in response. See Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed.
Reg. 34,942 (May 16, 2002).
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States Medical Center,69 which held that the FDA's proposed ban on advertising
of compounded drugs was unconstitutional because it did not satisfy the Central
Hudson commercial free speech test, the FDA published a notice7 ° requesting
public comments on the First Amendment issues raised by this and other cases,
and how it might properly regulate commercial speech within the bounds
permitted by the Constitution. The agency's request suggested it might well be
prepared to engage with industry and commentators on a more transparent basis.
The questions themselves were important: how can the agency advance public
health with fewer restrictions on speech? What can the FDA do to limit speech
on off-label uses of approved drugs? Does industry practice lead to over-
prescribing? Does the First Amendment allow for more limits on claims made in
labels than those made in advertisements? 71 There were a large number of
responses to this request. Some were critical of the agency, but others praised it
for soliciting views and prompting public debate. Yet despite the public response,
the FDA failed to take action, publish its views, or otherwise seek to resolve the
questions raised by Thompson.
With respect to enforcement, the process has become less transparent over
time, particularly with the increased involvement of the DOJ. The DOJ has long
been involved in the investigation and prosecution of possible violations of the
FDCA through the Civil Division and its Office of Consumer Litigation.
However, in recent years certain U.S. Attorneys' Offices, notably those in Boston
and Philadelphia, have developed innovative legal theories on misbranding and
the FCA premised on the primacy of FDA regulatory authority and the
impropriety of drug company off-label communication. These offices have
managed their cases without any apparent policy coordination. Accordingly,
there is an absence of transparency in terms of ascertaining standards as to
whether there has been wrongdoing by a company, whether a case is treated as a
criminal or civil matter, and what level of financial penalty should be levied if
there has been wrongdoing. Additionally, it is unclear whether and to what extent
a company's history of alleged wrongdoing or, conversely, its record of
cooperation and good behavior, will lead to greater or lesser penalties. Absent
judicial review and without a comprehensive code of written standards,
companies are left to digest and interpret the implications of the most recent civil
settlement and criminal plea agreements. These periodic pronouncements
effectively constitute silent or implicit rulemaking, in which an agency acts as
69. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
70. Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942.
71. See Lester M. Crawford, Jr., Commercial Speech and Public Health: Request for
Comment, 288 JAMA 36 (2002).
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both rule maker and adjudicator.72
While the Department's prosecution guidelines are set forth in the United
States Attorneys' Manual,73 it has resisted extending these general guidelines to
provide written policy direction with respect to off-label promotion cases. In
correspondence between the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) and the DOJ
occurring in 2004 and 2005, WLF urged senior Department officials to develop
such guidelines related to the investigation and disposition of cases involving the
communication of truthful, non-misleading speech.74 WLF argued that more
precise standards would serve two important purposes: they would inform the
industry as well as guide prosecutors. The Department declined the invitation and
rejected the notion that any additional policy guidelines were needed. Then
Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division Peter D. Keisler responded that
"the Department does not have theoretical views regarding off-label promotion of
products subject to regulation by the Food and Drug Administration .... The
Department applies the law to the facts of actual cases and, as a result, there is no
need for pure analysis of off-label promotion., 7
5
Further, while the DOJ has established corporate criminal culpability
guidelines in a series of written memoranda drafted and revised by successive
Deputy Attorneys General Thompson, Holder, and McNulty during the Bush
administration which are used to determine whether or not to charge corporations
with criminal violations of the law, 76 it is left to individual prosecutors and field
supervisors to determine whether a corporation's conduct actually warrants
criminal or civil treatment. Has the corporation cooperated meaningfully with the
prosecuting office in its investigation and review? Has the corporation agreed to
conduct its own investigation and waive any attorney-client privilege claims that
72. This consolidation of authority arguably is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006). The Act requires that those agencies
that develop administrative rules establish independent procedures for determining if the rules have
been violated. Here, DOJ interprets and applies the FDCA and FCA provisions, and enforces them
through the settlement process with minimal judicial review, as discussed in the text below.
73. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL (1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usam.
74. Letter from Daniel J. Popeo, Gen. Counsel, Wash. Legal Found., and Richard A. Samp,
Chief Counsel, Wash. Legal Found., to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice
(Mar. 24, 2005) (on file with author).
75. Letter from Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
David Price, Senior Vice President, Legal Affairs, Wash. Legal Found. (Oct. 5, 2004) (on file with
author).
76. See, e.g., Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't
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might otherwise apply in providing the prosecutors with the results of said
investigation? Does the improper marketing and promotional activity suggest that
it was the result of conscious corporate wrongdoing, or merely the result of a
limited number of renegade sales representatives? And how should prosecutors
make this determination? Prosecutors in the various U.S. Attorneys' Offices
around the country may apply these standards in different ways and give different
weight to the factors presented. Furthermore, given that meaningful review and
oversight from senior officials in the Department present political sensitivities
when reserved for the late stages of a delicate and complicated negotiated
settlement, it is difficult to achieve transparency or consistency under the current
process.77
As an example, consider reconciling the criminal treatment accorded Eli
Lilly in the 2003 case involving the alleged off-label promotion of Evista
(raloxifene HC1) for a treatment subsequently approved by the FDA with the civil
treatment of Bristol Myers-Squibb in 2007 for alleged promotional impropriety
involving its drug Abilify (aripiprazole). As another example of disparate
interpretation, some U.S. Attorneys' offices have begun to suggest in
negotiations that drug company sales representatives are violating the law by
"selling the side effects." The implication is that presenting possible adverse
reactions seen by other physicians in their patients who have taken the drug for
an off-label use, the company is effectively (if discreetly) promoting the product
for that off-label use. This focus also suggests that prosecutors will take a dim
view of companies whose sales representatives visit physicians who do not
prescribe on-label.
In effect, the absence of clear guidelines in this area makes it exceedingly
difficult to defend the company effectively. This stems from a lack of clarity in
77. See Barry Meier, Justice Dept. and Prosecutors Are Said To Have Disagreed on
OxyContin Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2007, at C4. In the absence of formal Department
prosecutorial guidelines, some comfort might be taken from evidence that senior officials are
providing policy oversight to the settlement of those cases prepared by U.S. Attorneys in this area.
Published reports indicated that senior Department officials initially disagreed with local
prosecutors over the noteworthy criminal plea agreement involving Purdue Pharma and three of its
senior executives, though the recommendations of the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of
Virginia eventually were accepted. This would seem to represent the kind of responsible policy
oversight that we would expect of senior officials in any cabinet agency. However, the Department
was criticized for what some regarded as an inappropriate attempt to politicize an investigation by
an otherwise independent U.S. Attorney.
78. The involvement of various state Attorneys General offices presents added challenges and
complexities, which makes it difficult for companies to develop global settlements with all relevant
federal and state authorities. Some states have developed "anti-fraud" revenue objectives into their
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the rules themselves and from a lack of transparency in the application and
enforcement of the rules. It arises in the context of establishing-or refuting-a
causal link between off-label prescribing and the company's marketing of the
product in question. In my experience, there is no evident willingness to engage
on the question of whether the allegedly improper promotion has actually led
physicians to prescribe off-label. Once counsel enters into settlement discussions,
the government will emphasize the statutory bases of criminal and civil liability.
For example, the FCA provides a civil penalty of up to three times the amount
that was falsely claimed from the government.79 On the criminal side, the
government may apply a multiplier of up to two times the amount of the
corporate gain or the government loss. However, these multipliers are only
meaningful if the underlying base amount (which represents the alleged level of
"inappropriate" off-label prescriptions) is derived in a fair and transparent
manner.
Some advocates have encouraged DOJ officials to seek advice from the
FDA prior to initiating investigations in order to determine whether the drug in
question is being prescribed outside the approved labeling for medically
appropriate reasons. 80 The FDA retains oversight responsibility for regulating the
communication of scientific and medical information and, as such, holds
institutional prerogative and memory. DOJ officials may well consult with the
FDA in developing a sophisticated medical and clinical perspective on specific
cases and in developing a broad policy approach to cases, but it is not evident
that they are doing so. Indeed, the perspective of former FDA policymakers
suggests that it does not occur other than at the investigatory level.8'
annual budgets, creating an incentive to push for a particular outcome regardless of the underlying
circumstances and federal policy imperatives. See New York Will Exceed Medicaid Fraud Recovery
Target for Fiscal Year 2008, BNA's HEALTH CARE DAILY REP., Sept. 19, 2008,
http://news.bna.com/hdn/HDLNWB/split display.adp?fedfid=108 (subscription access; on file with
author) (describing how in exchange for federal monies granted in 2006, New York committed to
recover hundreds of millions of dollars in Medicaid fraud and abuse in the state system).
79. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006).
80. See Scott Gottlieb, Resident Fellow, American Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Off-
Label Uses of Approved Drugs: Medicine, Law & Policy (May 21, 2008) (video available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnultymemo.pdf); see also Scott Gottlieb, From FDA,
a Good Framework for Distributing Information on Off-Label Uses, HEALTH AFF. ONLINE, Apr. 23,
2008, http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2008/04/23/from-fda-a-good-framework-for-distributing-
information-on-off-label-uses.
81. Perhaps not so much at the investigatory level either. A recent GAO report concluded that
the FDA had failed to develop adequate performance measures and otherwise to properly manage
its primary investigatory unit, the Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI). See U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: IMPROVED MONITORING AND
X:2 (2010)
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More extensive FDA involvement would not necessarily change the
dynamic, approach, or outcome of these cases. Government officials, whether
political appointees or career service, generally have strongly held policy
perspectives and are inclined to use their authority to advance their personal
ambitions, and to protect and strengthen the respective prerogatives and
preferences of the institutions they serve. This is entirely natural, but it is
troubling in light of the relatively limited bargaining power that companies
possess when faced with the threat of prosecution, the sanction of exclusion,
vicarious liability for executives, the costs of defense, and the prospect of public
disclosure of inflammatory documents. The best way to limit the unintended
impact of political motivations would be to establish a regulatory system based
upon a clear understanding of the rules that provides notice to, and engagement
with, the regulated parties, and then to apply the rules consistently and
transparently.
C. The Paucity of Federal Judicial Review
Article III of the Constitution established judicial authority to interpret the
law, and in so doing, provide a check on the power of the executive and
legislative branches of government. The deficiencies outlined above, an absence
of clarity in the regulations and an absence of transparency in rulemaking and
enforcement, can be remedied by the courts. But there have been relatively few
cases litigated by the drug companies accused of impropriety. This hesitancy to
contest allegations occurs because firms are cognizant of a 1998 revision to a rule
issued by the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). The revised rule
significantly altered the legal landscape by expanding the authority of the OIG to
exclude drug manufacturers from receiving federal health reimbursement monies
if they are found to have engaged in significant financial or other impropriety."
DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES NEEDED To STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF CRIMINAL AND
MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS (2010). However, this report will not necessarily result in senior
FDA officials injecting additional medical and clinical perspective into the investigatory process.
Instead, it seems likely to expand the potential criminal exposure of drug companies and their
executives in cases of alleged off-label promotion. In response to the GAO Report, the FDA is
developing criteria to increase the appropriate use of misdemeanor prosecutions, a valuable
enforcement tool, to hold responsible corporate officials accountable. Letter from Margaret A.
Hamburg, FDA Comm'r, to Senator Charles E. Grassley (Mar. 4, 2010), available at
http://grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/FDA-3-4-10-Hamburg-letter-to-Grassley-re-GAO-report-
on-OCI.pdf.
82. See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revised OIG Exclusion Authorities
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Prior to this, only those institutions that provided services directly to patients
(such as hospitals, hospices, day care providers, and diagnostic service providers)
could be excluded or "debarred" from federal financing program eligibility.
In issuing this expanded rule, the OIG noted that they "would not expect that
manufacturers would often be convicted and subject to mandatory exclusion."8 3
Drug companies receive a large portion of their total revenue and earnings from
reimbursements under the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs, and to lose
this would irrevocably cripple a company. Indeed, it is often said that no sane
company would ever challenge in court allegations that, if proven, would result
in a felony conviction and certain exclusion. In effect, companies that negotiate
settlements with the government to resolve allegations of illegal off-label
promotion can reasonably expect that the OIG will not exercise its discretion to
exclude the company from continuing to receive federal reimbursement funds;
companies that challenge the government's allegations in court clearly put the
company at risk of extinction as a felony conviction carries with it automatic
exclusion.
8 4
It is difficult to overstate the immense impact that this seemingly technical
clarification has had on the development of the legal and regulatory landscape.
As a practical matter, companies accused of wrongdoing must cooperate and
resolve the matter by settlement. They cannot realistically challenge the
government in court either on the facts, the underlying theories of liability, or
whether the charges alleged are compatible with the Constitution or even
consistent with FDA regulations themselves. The risk/reward calculus is skewed
dramatically in favor of settlement when a loss would jeopardize the firm's
viability by forfeiting government reimbursement for its products. As a result,
Resulting from Public Law 104-191, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,676 (Sept. 2, 1998).
83. See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revised OIG Exclusion Authorities
Resulting from Public Law 104-191, 63 Fed. Reg. at 46,679.
84. See Dan Levine, Marketing Tactics Put Johnson & Johnson Under DOJ Microscope,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 3, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=1202436012057&MarketingTacticsPutJohnsonJohnsonUnderDOJMicrosco
pe (reporting that federal prosecutors were considering indictment of Johnson & Johnson or its
Scios unit, which could lead to exclusion of parent or subsidiary); Sue Reisinger, In Their Long
Battle with Big Pharna, The Feds Have Held Back Their Nuclear Option. Why?, CORP. CoUNs.,
Feb. 1, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202437870117 (Discretionary
debarment is the OIG's "nuclear bomb" that has never been applied to exclude a major company as
it would limit patient access to drugs and "cost tens of thousands of jobs."); see also Michael K.
Loucks, Drug Busts on the Cheap Lack Power To Deter, Bus. WK., Mar. 8, 2010,
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-08/drug-busts-on-the-cheap-lack-power-to-deter-
michael-k-loucks.html (arguing that prosecutors need more resources to develop cases that will
lead to exclusion from federal programs).
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there are few opportunities to advance the law in any fair and reasonable way.
Some observers are skeptical generally of the ability of the courts to properly
evaluate the administrative policymaker's judgment in areas, like this, which
involve "social cost accounting., 85 But in an area that is replete with complexity
and nuance, such that even drug industry critics acknowledge significant First
Amendment considerations, fair-minded observers surely must ask why federal
courts have not had more opportunities to opine on these critical issues of legal
policy. The lawsuit brought last year by Allergan against the HHS Secretary and
the FDA Commissioner, described below, demonstrates the extraordinary lengths
to which companies will go in order to reduce enforcement risk and avoid
debarment.
D. The Limits on Communicating Truthful Information
The current enforcement environment is focused on conducting
investigations and threatening prosecution as a means of compelling settlements.
There is very little meaningful engagement with private industry. DOJ officials
fail to recognize the importance of communicating truthful, non-misleading
information to physicians. One might expect that regulators would be motivated
to satisfy policy objectives that protect the public health while facilitating
informed prescribing decisions. From a public health perspective, regulators
should consider whether or not the scientific and medical information is truthful
and not misleading, and whether or not physicians are prescribing the product in
a medically appropriate manner. However, the government is concerned solely
with whether the FDA has approved the indication in question. If it has not, and
the company conveys or in some way interacts with physicians on this
unapproved indication, then there will be a lengthy investigation and, in all
likelihood, a costly settlement under threat of prosecution.
86
DOJ officials have said that they do not believe the truthfulness of the
information is relevant,87 and that a manufacturer is liable under the FCA if it
knowingly implements a marketing plan that foreseeably caused third parties to
file claims for off-label uses that were not eligible for reimbursement.88
85. Diver defines this term as the "sophisticated and sensitive application of common sense."
Diver, supra note 49, at 109 (citing Jerry Mashaw, Administrative Due Process as Social-Cost
Accounting, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1423, 1441 (1981)). Courts are widely considered to lack the
investigative resources, analytical tools, and technical competence to more than simply rely on the
administrative record in upholding agency decisions.
86. See Loucks, supra note 21.
87. See id.
88. See id. A recent court decision suggests that the government may begin to see its theories
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Consistent with this interpretation, the current DOJ policy perspective is evident
in a court filing made in connection with a qui tam relator case against Pfizer. 9
In its filing, the DOJ rejects the view that a "false" statement under the False
Claims Act need be an affirmative misrepresentation; rather, "a material
omission will suffice." 90 In the case of alleged off-label promotion, this omission
may be established on the basis of the dissemination of information (even if
truthful and non-misleading) if "the FDA has specifically concluded that the drug
is not safe or effective for that use."91 The DOJ also contends that medical
compendia references to a drug's off-label use in support of reimbursement
coverage is insufficient to establish the veracity of a pharmaceutical company's
communication about that off-label use for purposes of the FCA.
Similarly, the 01G equates off-label promotion by a manufacturer with the
submission of a false claim for reimbursement, regardless of the inherent
truthfulness of the information.92 Its perspective may be gleaned from the
challenged, as some courts have criticized the Franklin result, and questioned whether off-label
promotion violations of the FDCA can form the basis of FCA liability. See United States ex rel.
Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 04-cv-0704, 2009 WL 1456582, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2009). Here,
the court rejected the government's theory that drug companies effectively facilitate false claims by
promoting illegally. "[T]he mere fact that Pfizer may have been violating FDA regulations does not
translate into liability for causing a false claim to be filed ... Pfizer did not file any claims for
reimbursement and made no implied certifications to obtain payment." Id. The case was dismissed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) for failing to assert with the requisite specificity facts
that would establish that a physician prescribed the product and that a pharmacist filled a
prescription based upon illegal off-label promotion. The court's observations, if adopted more
broadly, suggest that the reasoning of Franklin could be rejected or limited in subsequent rulings.
This development illustrates again the problems inherent in our existing process, where a single
federal district court ruling has exposed industry to billions of dollars in liability, as federal
prosecutors leverage this ruling and companies' inability to litigate to compel settlements.
89. United States' Statement of Interest at 1, United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 03-
CV- 11084 (D. Mass. 2008). The filing notes that the "United States has a keen interest in the
development of the law in this area." Id. The case involves the interpretation of the FCA, and the
DOJ submission is focused on disputing various contentions and interpretations contained in an
amicus curiae brief filed by the Washington Legal Foundation.
90. Id. at 9.
91. Id.
92. See Allegations of Waste, Fraud and Abuse in Pharmaceutical Pricing: Financial Impacts
on Federal Health Programs and the Federal Taxpayer: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 6-7 (Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief
Counsel, Office of the Inspector General), Although drug manufacturers do not generally submit
any claims for reimbursement, the government's perspective is that prescription drug promotion
outside the FDA-approved labeling effectively induces physicians to prescribe, which thereby
causes pharmacists to fill prescriptions and (false) reimbursement claims eventually to be filed.
X:2 (2010)
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evolving terms of its preferred model Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA). As a
condition of avoiding discretionary exclusion from federal reimbursement
programs, the government demands that drug and medical device firms that are
found to have violated the FDCA, the anti-kickback statute, or other provisions
of federal law, enter into a CIA prior to settlement of the case. CIAs now address
matters well beyond pricing and anti-kickback law compliance, and include
provisions related to the promotion of products. The CIA with Bristol-Myers
Squibb, for example, requires that the company direct all inquiries related to a
potential off-label use to the company's internal medical information
department.93 The CIA also requires that the company evaluate its proposed call
plan (for example, the plan specifying which physicians will be presented with
product related information by company sales representatives), specifically for
those products in its portfolio "having a high potential for off-label use that could
be driven by detailing an inappropriate audience" of physicians.94 There is no
hint that the government is concerned about the truthfulness or falsity of the
message. The OIG simply intends to limit the number and scope of physicians
who receive product information from company representatives.
In concert, these policy perspectives establish that the government-
specifically the FDA through its approval process-is the arbiter of what
information may be shared with physicians. 95 Moreover, law enforcement
93. See CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY 29-31
(Sept. 26, 2007). The use of monitors and other provisions of this Agreement have been criticized
by legal scholars in that they interject law enforcement officials into the internal workings of a
company, including decisions over personal and shareholder treatment. See Richard A. Epstein, The
Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006, at A14.
94. See CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, supra
note 93.
95. In contrast to the apparent views of the FDA, at least one federal court has seen fit to
qualify its authority. "And, despite the FDA's occasional statements in its briefs to the contrary,
physicians are a highly educated, professionally-trained and sophisticated audience. In making
prescribing decisions, doctors want (and need) to know first and foremost if the drug is the most
safe and effective means to treat the conditions suffered by the patients." Wash. Legal Found. v.
Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 63 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated on other grounds, Wash. Legal Found. v.
Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). "[T]he court must again note that off-label prescriptions,
presently legal, do constitute the most effective treatment available for some conditions. Through
the government's well-intentioned efforts to prevent misleading information from being
communicated, a great deal of truthful information will also be embargoed. In this case, the truthful
information may be life saving information, or information that makes a life with a debilitating
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officials will punish companies without regard to whether the promotional
message is truthful,96 and further may choose to limit the audience as to whom a
company's promotional or scientific communication may be directed. This
represents a disturbing level of intrusiveness on commercial speech and on the
practice of medicine.
V. BRINGING IT DOWN TO EARTH: SOME PRODUCT-RELATED CASE STUDIES
In considering the regulation of truthful and non-misleading off-label
communication, it is useful to consider the circumstances posed by several
product-based case studies. Each of these cases may seem anachronistic, but
together they illustrate the unworkable tension inherent in the current American
regime as it limits the free exchange of medical and clinical information.
A. Gilead Sciences' Viread (tenovir disoproxilfumarate)
In 2001, the FDA approved Viread for the treatment of HIV infection in
adults based upon its review of a study of previously treated adults infected with
HIV.97 Two years later, the FDA added clinical data to the labeling from a
second study, which examined treatment-naive patients and their experience with
the drug. Gilead has run ongoing clinical trials in order to accumulate additional
patient experience data from long-term observation.98 Publication of these
condition more comfortable." Id. at 73.
96. For example, the 2005 settlement involving Eli Lilly and its drug Evista for osteoporosis
was based exclusively on allegations of illegal, off-label promotion. In this case, the company was
accused of improperly providing doctors with information about the efficacy of using Evista to treat
breast cancer; this information tumed out to be substantially truthful as evidenced by FDA approval
in September 2007 for that very same indication. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Eli Lilly and
Company To Pay U.S. $36 Million Relating to Off-Label Promotion (Dec. 21, 2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/December/05_civ_685.html (announcing the civil settlement
and criminal plea agreement involving Eli Lilly and its product Evista). As another example, the
government has investigated Genentech for several years concerning allegations that it improperly
promoted off-label prescribing for its drug Rituxin in the treatment of certain kinds of lymphoma
that subsequently were approved by the FDA. See Genentech, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at
24 (Feb. 25, 2008), available at http://www.gene.com/gene/ir/downloadDoc.do?id=3841
(describing the ongoing investigation involving Genentech and its product Rituxan).
97. Prescribing and other background information on this product may be found at Gilead's
website. See Gilead Sciences, Highlights of Prescribing Information (Mar. 2010),
http://www.gilead.com/pdf/viread_pi.pdf.
98. See, e.g., Gilead Sciences To Present Viread Phase II Clinical Trial Data, MED. NEWS,
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clinical results serves to advance the science and, more importantly, enable the
medical community to better understand the safety and efficacy profile of the
drug after years of patient exposure.
This is important clinical work, as those who suffer from HIV and associated
health problems will likely remain on Viread for many years, at least as long as
the drug continues to be effective and reasonably tolerable or until a superior
treatment is developed and approved. As such, each public release of new long-
term clinical data is eagerly anticipated and received at prominent medical
conferences by physicians who treat patients with HIV. With each release of
data, there is a pattern of information migration that runs from the company to
conference attendees, to publication in peer-reviewed medical journals in the
United States and abroad, to submission by the company to various regulatory
authorities around the world. When the data finally is approved by the FDA and
other agencies for inclusion in the product labeling, it has taken at least ten
months, and usually far longer.
During the interim period, between the first presentation of the data to
physicians at a medical conference and the eventual approval by regulatory
authorities of modification of the product labeling, FDA regulations may not
allow Gilead to have any role in disseminating this truthful, non-misleading, and
extremely relevant clinical information.99 At the very least, FDA regulations
would not seem to permit Gilead field sales representatives or medical liaisons to
discuss this data with physicians. As such, the only physicians who will become
aware of the new clinical data on a timely basis would be those who were
involved directly in the Gilead clinical study or those who obtain the information
through their own independent efforts. Indeed, many physicians would not likely
become aware of the new data, and would not take the data into consideration in
their treatment of HIV patients. Although the data is at least arguably "consistent
with" the existing labeling, since the clinical studies in question are of the same
kinds of patients suffering from the same illness and being treated with the same
drug, current FDA regulations do not make clear that these distinctions freely
allow companies to disseminate information.' 00
99. See supra text accompanying notes 26-32.
100. Viread also has been approved to treat patients with chronic hepatitis B infection (CHB).
Gilead discovered this as the company reviewed data from its ongoing HIV clinical trials that
included subsets of patients who were co-morbidly infected with HIV and CHB. While additional
HIV patient data may be "consistent with" the existing labeling, it would not appear that data
related to an entirely new prospective use, such as treating CHB, would have been covered by this
broad standard prior to approval of the second indication. Press Release, Gilead Sciences, Phase III
Study Evaluating Gilead's Viread(R) for the Treatment of Chronic Hepatitis B Virus Meets
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B. Cephalon's Provigil (modafinil)
Provigil was approved by the FDA in late 1998 for the treatment of
excessive daytime sleepiness (EDS) associated with narcolepsy. 1' Although the
precise mechanism of action is not fully understood, it appears to work by
affecting an area of the brain that regulates wakefulness. The active ingredient,
modafinil, is not an amphetamine but a mild stimulant, and as such most patients
do not experience the jitteriness or other negative side effects associated with the
use of amphetamines. Clinical data and anecdotal evidence has demonstrated that
Provigil keeps patients awake and alert regardless of why they might be sleepy or
tired.'0 2
Cephalon discussed its clinical development plans with the FDA early on,
including the drug's potential utility in conditions other than narcolepsy.
Following these discussions, the company initiated a series of placebo-controlled
clinical studies with distinct groups of patients, each group representing a
recognized model of underlying sleep disorder or other medical condition. The
FDA suggested that if the company demonstrated efficacy and safety in each of
these patient groups, it could seek a broad label for the treatment of EDS
associated with any underlying medical condition. 10 3 The company studied
patients who were sleepy due to one of three conditions: narcolepsy (the first
approved indication), obstructive sleep apnea, or a disturbed circadian rhythm
pattern due to extended periods of shift work known as "shift work-sleep
disorder." These studies demonstrated efficacy across the board and showed a
limited number of relatively minor adverse events. However, after the additional
data was submitted to the agency in 2003, the FDA convened an advisory
committee which recommended against approving the broad label in favor of a
pseudo-specific label for use in EDS associated with each condition evaluated.10 4
Primary Endpoint (June 6, 2007), http://www.gilead.com/pr_1012569 (announcing positive Phase
III clinical results).
101. Prescribing and other background information on this product may be found at
Cephalon's Provigil website. See Cephalon, Patient Information Provigil Tablets (Mar. 2008),
http://www.provigil.com/media/PDFs/prescribinginfo.pdf.
102. See Joel Garreau, The Great Awakening, WASH. POST, June 17, 2002, at C1. See also All
on the Mind, ECONOMIST, May 22, 2008.
103. See CEPHALON, INC., PROVIGIL® (MODAFINIL) TABLETS (C-IV) SUPPLEMENTAL NDA:
BRIEFING DOCUMENT FOR PERIPHERAL AND CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM DRUGS ADVISORY
COMMITTEE MEETING 10 (Sept. 25, 2003), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/
briefing/3979B2_0lCephalon-Provigil.pdf.
104. Lois E. Krahn, Chair, Dep't Psychiatry and Psychology, Mayo Clinic, Remarks at the
Meeting of the U.S. FDA Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drugs Advisory Committee 184
(Sept. 25, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/DOCKETS/ac/03/
X: 2 (2010)
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This labeling decision virtually ensured a high level of off-label prescribing for
the product.
Indeed, many physicians became aware of the product and its intriguing
characteristics as the additional clinical studies were conducted, as data was
presented at medical meetings, and as the mainstream news media began to write
about the incredible "wonder drug"'' 0 5 that was being prescribed to pilots, college
students, and others who simply were sleepy or tired during the day without any
associated medical condition.10 6 Unaffiliated physicians and other third parties
conducted additional studies, which further increased awareness. For example,
the U.S. military conducted a number of clinical studies of aviator performance
and pilot sustained alertness while taking Provigil. 10 7 At the advisory committee
meeting, the FDA's Dr. Robert Temple suggested that he was not necessarily
troubled by off-label use of Provigil in the case of truck drivers or others who
might be driving while sleepy, noting that "[i]f they're driving next to me, I think
I'd prefer they be on it.",
10 8
transcripts/3979T2.pdf). Some committee members were concerned that a broader label would
result in unwarranted prescribing for patients who did not suffer from any underlying medical
disorder, but simply wished to have a "replacement for the normal amount of nighttime sleep."
105. Wil S. Hylton, The War. On Drugs., ESQUIRE, Feb. 1, 2003, at 116, 117.
106. Physicians have prescribed Provigil extensively for a number of off-label uses, but one
often cited has been fatigue associated with multiple sclerosis (MS). In fact, the National Multiple
Sclerosis Society characterizes the use of the drug as the standard of care ("medications commonly
used in the management of MS"). See National Multiple Sclerosis Society, Medication Used in MS,
http://www.nationalmssociety.org/about-multiple-sclerosis/what-we-know-about-
ms/treatments/medications/index.aspx. The Society makes reference to two clinical studies with
mixed results in its summary of the product, one study conducted over a nine-week period in 2000
by Cephalon that showed efficacy in a low dose of Provigil against placebo, and a second study
conducted in 2005 by a physicians' group in France that failed to show efficacy. However, the
Society notes that the clinical experience of physicians treating patients with MS has shown
"significant benefit for many patients with MS-related fatigue." See National Multiple Sclerosis
Society, supra note 9.
107. See, e.g., JOHN A. CALDWELL, JR. ET AL., U.S. ARMY AEROMEDICAL RESEARCH
LABORATORY, THE EFFECTS OF MODAFINIL ON AVIATOR PERFORMANCE DURING 40 HOURS OF
CONTINUOUS WAKEFULNESS: A UH-60 HELICOPTER SIMULATOR STUDY (1999); John A. Caldwell,
Jr. et al., A Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Investigation of the Efficacy of Modafinil for
Sustaining the Alertness and Performance of Aviators: A Helicopter Simulator Study, 150
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 272 (2000); see also Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of the Air Force,
supra note 10.
108. Robert Temple, FDA, Remarks at the Meeting of the Peripheral and Central Nervous
System Drugs Advisory Committee 186 (Sept. 25, 2003) (transcript available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/DOCKETS/ac/03/transcripts/3979T2.pdf).
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Two things are evident here. First, there is a host of factors outside the
control and influence of the company, including government-sponsored activities
that may well significantly affect the extent of off-label prescribing. Second,
Provigil is a case of a company developing clinical data with studies in
contemplation of a pending label expansion into related therapeutic areas in
which the underlying medical cause may differ, but the condition being treated is
the same or very similar. The initial, narrow indication approved by the FDA
(EDS associated with narcolepsy) suggests that this additional clinical data, all
related to efficacy in treating excessive daytime sleepiness, may not be
"consistent with" the labeling and therefore may not lawfully be communicated
by the company, and yet is truthful and relevant to physicians who might
prescribe the drug.
C. Genentech 's Avastin (bevacizumab) and Lucentis (ranibizumab injection)
The saga of these two biological products, each a therapeutic monoclonal
antibody designed to bind to and inhibit human vascular endothelial growth
factor (VEGF), received substantial press coverage and generated controversy in
the medical and patient community. 10 9 When VEGF is inhibited, the growth of
new blood vessels, or angiogenesis, is subsequently halted. Avastin, produced by
Genentech, was the first anti-angiogenesis therapy approved in the United
States." ° In 2004, the FDA approved it as a first-line treatment for patients with
metastatic carcinoma of the colon or rectum, and in 2006 it was approved as a
second-line treatment of colon or rectal cancer and a first-line treatment of non-
small cell lung cancer. Lucentis, a smaller molecule, or fragment version, of the
same active agent in Avastin,"' was approved in 2007 for the treatment of
neovascular age-related macular degeneration (AMD), a severe disorder of the
retina that is a major cause of vision loss in persons over age 60.' 12
Prior to the approval of Lucentis, a retinal specialist in Miami was reported
to have been the first to experiment with off-label use of a modified form of
Avastin to treat AMD. Subsequent to this reported experimentation with Avastin
109. See Andrew Pollack, Drug Maker and Eye Doctors Settle Dispute Over Avastin, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, at C4; see also News Release, Am. Acad. Of Ophthalmology,
Ophthalmologists Concerned About AMD Patients' Access to Avastin (Oct. 12, 2007),
http://www.aao.org/newsroom/release/20071012.cfm.
110. See Genentech, Medicines: Avastin, http://www.gene.com/gene/products/
information/oncology/avastin/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
111. Morten la Cour, Intravitreal VEGF-inhibitors: Is Avastin a Generic Substitute for
Lucentis? 85 AcrA OPHTHALMOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 2, 3 (2007).
112. See Genentech, Medicines: Lucentis, http://www.gene.com/gene/products/
information/tgr/lucentis/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
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and prior to the approval of Lucentis, Genentech struggled to address a number
of difficult issues associated with the demand for off-label use of an approved but
reformulated product, including drug access, distribution, pharmacy
compounding, safety, and price. There also are interesting questions of off-label
communication presented by this case.
Early on, Genentech acknowledged that the retinal physician community
was acting "with noble intent, which is to help patients who are going blind as we
speak ... [but] there have been no safety and toxicity studies conducted on
Avastin as an ophthalmic drug."'1 13 However, it also emphasized that off-label use
was increasing "because of advice generated by the medical community."" 4
What did Genentech do about communicating with physicians on the off-label
use? "We make educational material available to the doctors but we don't take a
position," said a Genentech executive." 5
Although the two products were quite similar, and intravitreal use of Avastin
was possible for those who purchased Avastin through a compounding pharmacy
that would then dilute the potency of the formulation, it was not the preferred
method of treatment. In fact, the company raised questions about the
maintenance of sterility in the process of dividing the Avastin dose due to a lack
of preservatives in that drug's formulation; Genentech also cited a warning letter
issued by the FDA to compounding pharmacies. 1 6 Following the approval of
Lucentis, the situation was further complicated by the company's decision to
charge far more for Lucentis on a volume basis, such that some retinal physicians
continued to purchase and dilute Avastin and legislators sought to pressure the
company into making Avastin readily available for the off-label use."17 The
company responded that it continued to believe that Lucentis was "the most
appropriate treatment for patients with . . . [AMD] because it was specifically
113. Genentech: Avastin Not Intended for AMD; Company Cautions on Off-Label Use of




116. Genentech, Features: Open Letter (Oct. 29, 2007), http://www.gene.com/gene/
features/avastin/open-letter.html.
117. Genentech caused a firestorm by pricing Lucentis at approximately $2,000 per one-time
monthly dose and announcing that it would no longer allow compounding pharmacies to purchase
Avastin from its wholesalers. Shortly thereafter, following the announcement by U.S. Senator
Herbert Kohl (D-Wisconsin) that his Senate Committee on Aging would launch an investigation
into Genentech's decision to limit Avastin availability, the company announced that it had reached
agreement to continue to allow retina specialists and ophthalmologists access to Avastin under
certain circumstances. See Pollack, supra note 109.
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designed, formally studied, approved by the [FDA] and manufactured for
intraocular delivery . . . [but it] does not interfere with physicians' prescribing
choices."' 18
Leaving aside the apparent contradictions inherent in government officials
effectively encouraging off-label use of an untested product, Genentech was at
the very least in a terribly awkward position during the period 2004 to 2007 as
interest in off-label use of Avastin intensified. Although the company could
freely reiterate and emphasize any statements made by the FDA, it is not clear
that it could lawfully communicate directly to physicians any safety information
that related to the off-label use. This alternate use, unrelated to the approved
cancer indications and which, by the company's own admission, raised concerns
of eye infections, could not possibly be said to be "consistent with" the FDA-
approved labeling. From a public policy perspective, it would be preferable to
permit companies to act in an ethically responsible manner and to share fully any
concerns about prevailing physician practice, rather than to limit communication
to a brief press statement and the dissemination of peer-reviewed journal articles.
But the current regulatory environment does not allow companies to do this.
D. Allergan's Botox (botulinum toxin)
Botox, a purified form of botulinum toxic, is a popular injectable biologic
product used cosmetically to combat wrinkles and facial lines as well as a
prescription therapeutic approved by the FDA to treat abnormal tone in muscles
known as dystonia." 9 Physicians also prescribe Botox to treat spasticity, or
involuntary muscle contractions. Botox has been approved in a number of
countries outside the United States to treat spasticity, and Allergan recently
obtained FDA approval to treat spasticity in the flexor muscles of the elbow,
wrist, and fingers in adults.120 However, physicians are likely to continue to use
Botox for other off-label conditions, including lower limb spasticity and
spasticity in juveniles suffering from cerebral palsy.
There is a risk of adverse "distant spread of toxin" associated with the
injection of Botox. In connection with this risk, the FDA ordered Allergan and all
other manufacturers of botulinum toxin to add a special "boxed warning" to the
existing label and package insert, and to adopt a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategy (REMS). 121 In connection with its decision, the FDA noted that its
118. Press Statement, Genentech, Avastin Distribution Update (Dec. 20, 2007),
http://www.gene.com/gene/features/avastin/press-statement.html.
119. See Allergan, Botox Portal, http://www.botox.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
120. See FDA, FDA Approves Botox to Treat Spasticity in Flexor Muscles of the Elbow,
Wrist and Fingers (Mar. 9,2010), http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/ucm203776.htm.
121. See FDA, FDA Requires Boxed Warning for All Botulinum Toxin Products (Apr. 30,
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intention was not to discourage the use of botulinum toxins for spasticity, as they
remain "very effective" and "commonly used."'12 2 The application of this order
has placed Allergan and the other manufacturers of this product in an untenable
position. While the FDA has approved the warning information included in the
modified labeling and directed the companies to implement the terms of the
REMS, the use of the product in spasticity has not yet been approved. As such,
FDA regulations do not allow Allergan to speak freely with physicians about the
fine points of product administration that might further reduce risk, such as
dosing frequency, injection technique, and optimal patient selection.
In response to this conundrum, Allergan has brought an action against the
FDA and the DOJ in federal district court in Washington.123 The lawsuit asks the
court to determine that a number of FDA regulations are unconstitutional, either
on their face or as applied to truthful speech of drug manufacturers, and it asks
for preliminary and permanent injunctions that would enjoin the government
from taking any civil or criminal enforcement action against Allergan on the
basis of its expression of truthful and non-misleading speech. This presents a
unique opportunity for a federal court to consider the FDA framework for
regulating off-label medical and scientific information. Unlike prior cases in
which the First Amendment has been used as a defensive shield in circumstances
where companies or their employees were accused of communicating false or
misleading information, the company is asking the court to affirmatively permit it
to discuss truthful information.
This case, and those others summarized above, might be seen as unusual, but
they serve to illustrate the particularly anomalous results that can flow from a
regulatory enforcement policy that deems all scientific and medical information
not included in the FDA-approved labeling as unworthy of dissemination, and
regards those who dare do so as criminals.
2009), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm149574.htm. A Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) is required for certain drugs and biological products
determined by the FDA to present safety risks. See Food & Drug Admin., FDA Issues Draft
Guidance on Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (Sep. 30, 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2009/ucm 184399.htm.
122. Ellis Unger, Office of New Drugs, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food & Drug
Admin., Remarks at the FDA Media Briefing on Botulinum Toxin Products (Apr. 30, 2009)
(transcript available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/NewsEvents/Newsroom/MediaTranscripts/ucml69170).
123. See Johnathan D. Rockoff, Allergan Suit Seeks to Lift Botox Curbs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2,
2009, at B4; Natasha Singer, Botox Maker's Suit Cites Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009, at
B3.
41
Osborn: Can I Tell You the Truth?
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE
Major drug companies operate on a global scale and are subject to oversight
by authorities in various jurisdictions that act to enforce their respective laws and
regulations. The broad policy objectives of regulators in Europe are identical to
those in the United States: they want clear, hard rules that can be consistently
enforced and which will lead to high levels of industry compliance. 24 However,
the United Kingdom long has approached the regulation of advertising and
promotion of medicines in a markedly different way. Consistent with a deep
tradition of flexibility in its regulation, and more specifically of an evident
fondness for private, self-regulation that began in the early twentieth century, 125
rulemaking and enforcement in this area are developed and led by a self-
regulating body associated with the trade organization of British pharmaceutical
manufacturers. Whereas the executive branch develops and enforces the rules in
the United States, in Britain the responsible government agency has a more
limited role, making the UK regulatory scheme even more unusual in that it is
neither wholly private nor wholly public. Like the United States, the statutory
language is necessarily written broadly. Unlike the United States, this statutory
language is supplemented by a detailed code of practice that is adopted,
interpreted, implemented, and largely enforced apart from the government. And
unlike the United States, there have been virtually no prosecutions. 126
124. The observations set forth throughout this section are based, in part, on information
obtained in interviews with Jeremy Mean, Group Manager, Information for Public Health, UK
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), in London (Apr. 2008), and
Heather Simmonds, Director, Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authority (PMCPA), in
London (Apr. & June 2008).
125. Britain "appears to be something of a haven for self-regulation." Rob Baggott,
Regulatory Reform in Britain: The Changing Face of Self-Regulation, 67 PUB. ADMIN. 435, 438
(1998). Another commentator observed that Britain generally is more "flexible and informal" in its
regulation of society. DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 21 (1986). Consistent with these observations, there is a
long history in Great Britain of private, self-regulation of advertising. See generally T.R. NEvET-r,
ADVERTISING IN BRITAIN (Heinemann on behalf of the History of Advertising Trust 1982). In 1919,
the date often cited as the start of self-regulation of medicines advertising, an association of fifty
manufacturers of patent medicines was established to control "inaccurate or misleading practices."
Id. at 104. Public criticism mounted, however. For example, a 1934 report by the Royal College of
Surgeons found that advertising claims for medicines were "always exaggerated and are, in general,
purely fraudulent," and the medicines themselves often have "no substances of therapeutic value."
Id. at 164. In response to this criticism, and perhaps in a prescient effort to stave off government
action, the association adopted a code of standards in 1936; in hindsight, many regard this first code
as an important precedent supporting the concept of self-regulation. ld. at 164-65.
126. For a review of trends in effective corporate self-regulation, see CHRISTINE PARKER, THE
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By definition, the self-regulating model requires the full engagement of the
regulated industry members, 127 who must agree on the conceptual framework as
well as the specific rules that delineate, refine, and clarify the language of the
code over time; drug manufacturers developed and adopted the code in Great
Britain and thus, have a substantial stake in its success. They also fear reprisals,
which carry the stigma of peer condemnation. 128 Moreover, the self-regulating
system is accompanied by government oversight and an implicit threat of
enhanced government enforcement or statutory enactment. Ultimately, if the
system is seen as ineffective by public officials and their constituents, industry
risks losing a relatively sophisticated and benevolent taskmaster that, while it
may threaten to withhold the carrot of association membership, does not wield a
OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY (2002). As Parker suggests,
the United States has a degree of self-regulation in the form of the U.S. Sentencing Commission
Guidelines that were established in the late 1980s, reflecting the common use of criminal sanctions
for corporate malfeasance. These guidelines encourage private firms to adopt extensive internal
compliance programs, including education and self-reporting mechanisms, and provide reduced
sentences for those companies that do so and yet are later found to have committed violations of the
law. Id. at 259-60.
127. See A. Ogus, Rethinking Self-Regulation, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 97 (1995),
reprinted in A READER ON REGULATION 375 (Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott & Christopher Hood
eds., 1998). Noted regulatory scholar John Braithwaite also has written favorably of self-regulation,
noting that it may well be more efficient, more flexible, and less costly than traditional command
and control methods. See John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466
(1982). See also JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
(1984), in which he concludes that large drug firms effectively allocate responsibility for corporate
misdeeds to subordinates and external contractors.
128. All breaches of the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) Code of
Practice are posted on the website of the Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authority
(PMCPA), a quasi-autonomous unit of the ABPI, with the following characterization: "[Company]
has breached the ABPI Code of Practice for the Pharmaceutical Industry and brought discredit
upon, and reduced confidence in, the pharmaceutical industry." Prescription Medicines Code of
Practice Authority, Advertisements, http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/?q=advertisements (last visited Mar.
29, 2010). As one executive based in the United Kingdom told me in a confidential interview, "we
all have a huge incentive to avoid coming before the panel." In the United States, the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) in 2002 first adopted a Code of
Interactions with Healthcare Professionals, which was useful in developing an industry consensus
as to appropriate marketing and promotional practices. But its public policy impact is limited in that
there is no functional equivalent to the quasi-private enforcement mechanism of the British
PMCPA, as discussed below. See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS OF AM., CODE
ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS (Jan. 2009), available at
http://www.phrma.org/files/attachments/PhRMA%20Marketing/o2OCode%202008.pdf.
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heavy club in the manner of the state.
This section will summarize the European and British statutory frameworks
for the regulation of advertising and promotion of medicines. It will review a
2005 House of Commons Health Committee report on the undue influence of the
pharmaceutical industry and consider the responses to the report from the
responsible government agency, the trade group, and the industry. Next, the
section will review some recent panel cases and other anecdotal and qualitative
outcome data in an effort to gauge the effectiveness of the system. Finally, it will
compare the British to the American system according to the normative criteria
set forth above. There are significant differences in the respective reimbursement
environments for off-label use of drugs, and the concomitant financial incentives
to promote or otherwise encourage off-label prescribing are lower in Britain.
Still, in keeping with its tradition of self-regulation, Britain has reasonably clear
rules that allow for cases to be brought and resolved expeditiously in a
transparent process with opportunity for appeal and with an unusually high level
of engagement with industry.
A. Statutory Framework
Within the European Union there are multiple layers of law, regulation, and
industry standards that govern the advertising and promotion of prescription
drugs. At the highest level, the current EU directive 129 requires that member
states adopt local legislation that broadly prohibits the unauthorized advertising
and promotion of prescription medicine and requires that all advertising comply
with the approved labeling. Significantly, this directive permits "voluntary
control of advertising of medicinal products by self-regulating bodies.' 130 The
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA)
Code of Practice on the Promotion of Prescription-Only Medicines to, and
Interactions with, Healthcare Professionals establishes a more detailed
framework that all member state private associations may reference and further
expand. 131
129. Council Directive 2004/27, art. 88, 2004 O.J. (L.136) 34, 51 (EC).
130. Id.
131. See EUROPEAN FED'N OF PHARM. INDUS. & ASS'NS, EFPIA CODE ON THE PROMOTION OF
PRESCRIPTION-ONLY MEDICINES TO, AND INTERACTIONS WITH, HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS (2007),
available at http://www.efpia.eu/content/default.asp?PageID=559&DocID=3483. The EFPIA Code
provides clear, useful guidance in certain areas. For example, Article 12 proscribes service
agreements that would induce the recommending, prescribing, or selling of medicine. Id. at 12.
Article 14 goes into detail regarding consulting agreements with health care professionals, noting
that "token consultancy arrangements should not be used to justify compensating healthcare
professionals." Id. at 13. Article 18 mandates that each national member include local enforcement
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The Medicines Act of 1968 provides the basic statutory framework for the
promotion and sale of prescription drugs in the United Kingdom. The Medicines
and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) is the government agency
responsible for protecting public health by ensuring the safe use of
pharmaceuticals. In contrast with the FDA, the MHRA does not assume primary
responsibility for routine oversight of pharmaceutical company advertising and
promotion. Instead, it reserves for itself the prerogative to focus on those matters
and products that present the potential for serious risk to public health.
Simultaneously, it works to ensure that a quasi-autonomous unit of the
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), known as the
Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authority (PMCPA), effectively
controls advertising and promotion through the interpretation and enforcement of
its code of practice on a day-to-day basis.'32
One of the most readily apparent differences between the environment in the
United States and that in the United Kingdom is the level of clarity provided to
industry about the rules of engagement. The MHRA "Blue Guide"' 33 offers
reasonably clear and understandable guidance on promotion and advertising.34
provisions that are "proportionate to the nature of the infringement, have a deterrent effect and take
account of repeated offences of a similar nature or patterns of different offences." Id. at 18.
132. The relationship between the MHRA, the ABPI, and the PMCPA was established
formally in a memorandum of understanding in 2005. See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BRITISH PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, THE PRESCRIPTION
MEDICINES CODE OF PRACTICE AUTHORITY AND THE MEDICINES AND HEALTHCARE PRODUCTS
REGULATORY AGENCY (2005), available at http://www.abpi.org.uk/links/assoc/PMCPA/
Memo understandingnov3.pdf. The memorandum characterizes the British regulatory framework
as "robust" and comprised of "two complementary systems of control, self regulation by the
pharmaceutical industry by means of the ABPI Code of Practice. . . administered by the PMCPA,
and UK law, administered by the MHRA." Id. at 1. The underlying philosophy is that "[e]fficient,
stringent and transparent self regulation via the ABPI Code enables the Government to ensure that
regulatory requirements are met.., with intervention by the MHRA when there is a clear case for
protection." Id.
133. MEDS. AND HEALTHCARE PRODS. REGULATORY AGENCY, THE BLUE GUIDE: ADVERTISING
AND PROMOTION OF MEDICINES IN THE UK (2005), available at http://www.mhra.gov.uk/
home/idcplg?IdcService=GET-FILE&dDocName=CON007552&RevisionSelectionMethod=Lates
tReleased.
134. For example, Section 5.14 provides that company press releases "should be genuinely
newsworthy rather than having the intention of promoting a product ... [and] should provide the
context in which the medicine will be used and the population for which it has been licensed." Id. at
23. Section 5.15 makes clear that companies may respond to questions from health care
professionals, though the answers must be balanced and fairly responsive to the question asked. Id.
This is not to suggest that the European and British codes are so clear that all queries are
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resolved, or that there is no room left for interpretation. A critical question in the European Union,
as it is in America, lies in defining where scientific exchange ends and advertising or promotion
begins. This question is at issue in the European Commission's proposal on the dissemination
directly to the general public of non-promotional information on prescription medicines. As the
Commission noted, the "current legal framework (Directive 2001/83/EC, as amended by Directive
2004/27/EC) does not provide for sufficient harmonised rules on the provision of information about
medicines to patients." European Commission, Information to Patients, Legislative Approach,
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/pharmaceuticals/human-use/information-to-patient/legislative
_en.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). The Public Consultation provides that information to be
provided to patients "should be compatible with approved summaries of product characteristics...
and it should not go beyond the key elements specified in them." EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PUBLIC
CONSULTATION: LEGAL PROPOSAL ON INFORMATION TO PATIENTS 6 (Feb. 5, 2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/pharmaceuticals/files/pharmacos/docs/doc2008/2008 02/info
_topatientsconsult_200802_en.pdf. Interestingly, the United Kingdom's response to the Public
Consultation on this very point notes that, in the view of the MHRA, "it is not possible to develop a
clear definition, based solely on the content of the information, of what is non-promotional
information about medicines in order to distinguish clearly between advertising and information."
Letter from Pub. Health Meds. & Healthcare Prods. Regulatory Agency, to European Comm'n
Enter. & Indus. Directorate-Gen. (Apr. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.mhra.gov.uk/home/idcplg?ldcService=GETFILE&dDocName=CON014932
&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased. Following Public Consultation, the Commission
adopted two proposals that, subject to affirmation by the Council of Europe and the European
Parliament, would amend existing EC Directives governing the provision of information to the
general public on prescription drugs. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council Amending, as Regards Information to the General Public on
Medicinal Products Subject to Medical Prescription, Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community
Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, COM (2008) 663 final (Oct. 12, 2008),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri
=COM:2008:0663:FIN:en:PDF; Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council Amending, as Regards Information to the General Public on
Medicinal Products for Human Use Subject to Medical Prescription, Regulation (EC) No 726/2004
Laying Down Community Procedures for the Authorisation and Supervision of Medicinal Products
for Human and Veterinary Use and Establishing a European Medicines Agency, COM (2008) 662
final (Oct. 12, 2008), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=COM:2008:0662:FIN:en:PDF.
Commentators are generally skeptical that the proposals will be adopted, as many are
concerned that it will be difficult in practice to distinguish between the provision of medical and
scientific information, and advertising itself, which will continue to be prohibited. See, e.g., Ian
Schofield, EU Pharmaceutical Package Struggles with Information Overload, INFORMA UK (Nov.
6, 2009) ("The pharmaceutical industry and many members of the European Parliament are in
favour of the patient information proposal, but most EU member state governments are not. They
agree on the need to improve the provision of reliable, unbiased information on prescription drugs
throughout Europe, but not by giving pharmaceutical companies a role.").
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There is a refreshing level of candor and engagement with industry by British
government officials that extends well beyond the issuance of mere rules, to
encompass meaningful, ongoing discussion about the kinds of practical
challenges faced on a routine basis. 13' The ABPI Code of Practice for the
Pharmaceutical Industry 136 attempts to define the line between promotion and
scientific exchange by making clear that promotion does not include responding
to physician inquiries, providing factual information without making a claim, or
providing information related to human health or disease while omitting
reference to a specific medicine. It also provides guidance concerning gifts from
pharmaceutical companies to health care professionals by limiting them to
inexpensive items of modest value that are relevant to their work. In recent years,
the MHRA has also undertaken multiple publication initiatives that are designed
to convey more clearly its policy views on industry advertising material, and in
so doing, significantly improve transparency, and has undertaken significant
additional pre-launch review of promotional materials, as well as certain other
advertising.
137
The essence of the British system is that competitors, former employees,
physicians, patients, and the MHRA itself can bring complaints against ABPI
members for violating the advertising and promotional rules and regulations. The
complaints are frequent (more than one hundred per annum), they are decided
promptly (within months if not weeks generally), they may be appealed
(generally only about 20% of the initial rulings are overturned), and they allow
135. For example, Jeremy Mean of the MHRA presented on the topic of web-based
pharmaceutical company communication in Manchester in September of 2007. In his presentation,
Mr. Mean acknowledged the fundamental definitional problem up front-namely, that there are
clear rules covering labeling language and formal business announcements, and clear rules
covering the content and use of promotional material, but, in his words, "what about everything in
between?" Mr. Mean then went on to attempt to answer the question he himself raised, spelling out
the conditions under which companies may communicate via the web, but noting as well that there
is likely to be new legislation in this area forthcoming. Jeremy Mean, Group Manager, Info. for
Pub. Health, Meds. & Healthcare Prods. Regulatory Agency, Address at British Pharmaceutical
Conference: From Manchester to Malta--Communicating to Patients across Europe (Sept. 7, 2007)
(on file with author).
136. ASS'N OF THE BRIT. PHARM. INDUS., CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY (2008), available at http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/files/sitecontent/
ABPICode of Practice 2008.pdf. The ABPI Code of Practice was first established in 1958, and
the most recent version came into force on July 1, 2008. It is developed by the ABPI in consultation
with the MHRA, the British Medical Association, the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great
Britain, and the Royal College of Nursing, adopted by the ABPI, and administered by the PMCPA.
137. Mean, supra note 135.
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full participation of the parties.138 Perhaps the most significant aspect of this
process, especially as it relates to the question of improper off-label promotion, is
that panel decisions convey heightened levels of clarity and transparency to
industry.
B. The Politics of Self-Regulation
The British system has not been without its critics, but when faced with a
scathing report issued by a Parliamentary Committee, government and industry
responded expeditiously to address the perceived deficiencies. In 2004 and 2005,
a select Committee on Health of the British House of Commons undertook a
sweeping review of the influence of the pharmaceutical industry in the country, 3 9
encompassing among many subjects advertising, promotion, and medical
education. In its review of existing circumstances related to the advertising and
promotion of prescription drugs, the Committee levied criticism at each of the
involved parties. It criticized the industry for inappropriate activities such as
employing ghostwriters for medical journal articles and soliciting physicians
excessively. 40 It criticized physicians themselves for lacking independence.141 It
138. See Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authority, Constitution and Procedure, in
ABPI, CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 136, at 39-53. The statistics provided were compiled by the
author based on the case information available at Prescription Medicines Code of Practice
Authority, Completed Cases, http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/?q=completedcases (last visited Mar. 29,
2010).
139. HEALTH COMM., HOUSE OF COMMONS, THE INFLUENCE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY (Mar. 22, 2005), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm2004O5/cmselect/cmhealth/42/42.pdf (U.K.). The Committee's perspective was
fair and reasonable on its face, as it acknowledged that companies have every right to market their
products and to attempt to influence the market environment, but at the same time should not rely
on misleading communications or fail to disclose new safety data or potential risks associated with
the product. The Committee further identified the government's role as one of using impartial
judgment to detect excess and limit actions that might be adverse to the public interest, a task it
acknowledged as difficult and that required productive collaboration between the private and public
sectors.
140. Id. at 53-55. The Committee criticized the aggregate number of company promotional
details and repeat visits of individual sales representatives ("drug company representatives' contact
with doctors 'can almost be on a daily basis"'), the extent of free meals and other "promotional
hospitality masquerading as education," and what it called the "scale of medicines advertising." Id.
at 57-59, 64. On the latter point, the Committee expressed concern with product launch
commercialization activities where "explosive marketing occurs at precisely the period in which we
know least about the effects of a drug in the community." Id. at 58. "The intensive marketing which
encourages inappropriate prescribing of drugs must be curbed." Id. at 105. The Committee cited,
for example, benzodiazepines as a group of products that well illustrated the problems associated
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criticized the MHRA for inadequate pre-vetting of advertising and marketing
materials and for the length of time taken to resolve complaints presenting
serious risks to public health. 42 It criticized the PMCPA for the duration of time
taken to complete self-initiated investigations and for its failure to sufficiently
coordinate its work with the MHRA. 143 In general, the Committee was not
convinced that the private, self-regulatory system was working effectively,
noting delays in investigations and in the issuance of corrective statements, and
that sanctions for violations often were not serious.
With the system of private, self-regulation of medicines advertising at risk,
the MHRA, the PMCPA, and the industry initiated a series of changes in direct
response to the House of Commons report. The MHRA, as the responsible
government agency acting under the direction of the British Parliament, faced
substantial political pressure to respond to the report and reform the system.
Rather than resorting to broadside attacks on drug companies, the agency
reiterated the significance of the industry to Great Britain by endorsing its many
contributions to public health.' 44 The MHRA expanded its pre-vetting of all
promotional material for newly approved drugs, encouraged the PMCPA to
consider changes to its code of practice, and sought to better coordinate its work
with the PMCPA. In addition, the MHRA completed an internal review that
with what it characterized as "over-promotion and over-prescription." Id. at 65.
141. "[T]he blame for inadequate or misinformed prescribing decisions [also lies] with
... doctors and other prescribers who do not keep abreast of medicines information and are
sometimes too willing to accept hospitality from the industry and act uncritically on the information
supplied by the drug companies." Id. at 64.
142. "We recommend that all the promotional material for a new product be pre-vetted by the
MHRA prior to publication ... " Id. at 105. In addition, the Committee "recommend[ed] that there
be an independent review of the MHRA." Id. Such a review could "determine whether the
processes now used for decision-making are adequate and reflect a patients' health needs and
society's expectations." Id. at 106.
143. "When the PMCPA has evidence that a company has breached the regulations it should
inform the MHRA .... [C]orrective statements [should] always be required." These statements
should be "given as much prominence as the original promotional piece." Id. at 106.
144. "The pharmaceutical industry is an important sector for the UK. It has an outstanding
record of innovation for the benefit of patients, and of investment in the economy. It has to be
recognised that to carry out its business Government and its agencies will have dealings with the
industry. It has long been the Government's policy that these dealings must be balanced and
appropriate with an aim of securing beneficial outcomes for patients and the economy." SEC'Y OF
STATE FOR HEALTH, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE HEALTH COMMITTEE'S REPORT ON THE
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resulted in changes to the complaint investigation process with enhanced
transparency from publications of decisions and guidance, shorter duration in the
investigation and decision making process, and increased use of corrective
statements and consideration of prosecution in extreme cases.145 The MHRA
publicly expressed its intolerance with any future failure to comply with the
law. 146 In 2006, the PMCPA adopted a stricter code of practice. 147 Companies
themselves examined their business practices, limited the extent of their
hospitality, and excised the influence of commercial organizations in meetings
with outside scientific and medical advisers.
C. UK Code of Practice Panel Decisions
In reviewing a range of PMCPA cases from the last few years that raised
questions of improper advertising and promotion outside the approved labeling,
some important principles are apparent. In general, the panel decisions present a
fairly high level of sophistication and judgment. Moreover, the decisions serve to
enhance significantly the level of clarity of guidance and transparency of thought
process, which are publicly available to firms operating in the United Kingdom.
First, the PMCPA panels appear more inclined than U.S. prosecutors to give
the benefit of the doubt to the company if preliminary documentation is not
damning and will not launch a multi-year investigation on the basis of a single
complaint.1 48 In a case brought by an anonymous employee, the panel noted that
145. For a summary of the MHRA internal review, see Jeremy Mean & Beryl Keeley, Review
ofAdvertising Procedures, 17 INT'L J. PHARM. MED. 185 (2003).
146. As an example, the MHRA upheld complaints against two drug distribution and retail
firms in the United Kingdom for excessive promotion and discounting, and went on the BBC to
publicize its enforcement actions. 2-for-I Painkiller Deals Attacked, BBC NEws, June 14, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/health/4091184.stm.
147. The 2006 code of practice enhanced its provisions related to patient safety warning
requirements, better defined and restricted promotional gifts and hospitality, better defined
permissible relationships with patient groups, banned promotional competitions and placed a cap
on advertising pages, accelerated the pace of complaint resolutions, and strengthened various
penalties for code violations. See ASS'N OF THE BRIT. PHARM. INDUS., CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (2006), available at http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/files/
sitecontent/code06use.pdf. Sanctions meted out by the PMCPA have become more severe.
Although there has still only been one prosecution for promotional impropriety in British history,
there have been suspensions from ABPI membership of several leading multinational drug
companies, including Abbott Laboratories, Roche, and Merck's affiliate, MS&D.
148. See, e.g., Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Auth., CASE AUTH/2043/9/07,
Anonymous Employee v Sanofi-Aventis, CODE PRAc. REv., Nov. 2007, at 139, available at
http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/files/2007%2ONovember/20Review.pdf. This case stands in contrast to
the American practice, where "whistleblower" complaints are kept confidential under the qui tam
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although it had some concerns about the company using its cardiovascular
scientific advisors to initiate promotional discussions using unlicensed data with
"difficult to access customers," there was no direct evidence of impropriety and
no way to obtain additional information since the complainant was
anonymous. 149 Second, there is an ongoing effort to clarify ambiguous areas of
the law. In a case brought by a physician, the panel's decision focused on website
linkage questions in finding that the company breached the code by referring
health professionals from a patient group website to another website that itself
contained references on the use of its product for a then-unapproved condition. 50
Third, the panels are willing to consider the most difficult definitional and
contextual issues in the area, including subtle distinctions between scientific
exchange and promotion. In a case brought by a competing company, the panel
engaged in a detailed analysis of the specific circumstances related to
sponsorship of an independent abstract with an unrestricted medical grant. 51
Here, although the company expected that the published abstract would contain
some favorable reference to its then unapproved protease inhibitor, the panel
found that this did not constitute illegal off-label promotion since there was no
direct contact with the editor and no substantive influence on the publication.
152
Fourth, in reaching judgments, the panels are sensitive to prevailing clinical and
medical practice issues. For example, a panel found that a company's promotion
of combination therapy in the treatment of breast cancer was permissible in that
the approved labeling did not specifically limit the product's use to monotherapy,
and that combination therapy was an integral part of accepted medical practice. 1
53
statute, and the DOJ is required to investigate the allegations.
149. See id. at 140.
150. See Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Auth., CASE AUTH/1801/2/06, General
Practitioner v GlaxoSmithKline, CODE PRAc. REV., Aug. 2006, at 20, 24, available at
http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/files/August_2006.pdf. Although GSK strongly refuted the allegation
since the advertisement containing the referral was published by a patient support group and did not
disclose proprietary product names or make product claims, this ruling was upheld on appeal. The
panel regarded the website linkage as inappropriate, noting that otherwise "companies would be
able to refer to independent websites as a means of avoiding the restrictions in the Code." Id.
151. See Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Auth., CASE AUTH/1696/3/05, Bristol
Myers-Squibb v Boehringer Ingelheim, CODE PRAC. REV., Aug. 2005, at 125, 127, available at
http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/files/2005_AugustReview.pdf. Boehringer subsequently distributed the
abstract on an unsolicited basis to physicians, though other HIV treatment products also were
referenced in the publication. This was found to constitute scientific exchange, and not promotion.
152. See id. at 127.
153. See Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Auth., CASE AUTH/1674/1/05, Sanofi-
Aventis v Pierre Fabre, CODE PRAC. REV., Aug. 2005, at 58, 60-61, available at
51
Osborn: Can I Tell You the Truth?
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
These cases illustrate several important features of the self-regulatory system
in the United Kingdom. The MHRA process is expeditious, as it does not involve
extensive discovery and investigatory burden. It also is transparent, as it moves
from broad EU guidelines to slightly refined UK law, to more detailed ABPI
codification, to yet more detail in the interpretation of rules in the context of
actual business practice. The opinions themselves are clear in expressing both
results and reasoning. The panel process is equitable and adheres to widely
accepted due process principles, as it addresses complaints from all interested
parties, including competitor companies, and allows for appeals. Although the
UK system is focused on ensuring compliance with the law and applicable
regulation, it appears to be congruous with the prevailing realities of medical
practice and the consideration of relevant clinical data.
VII. EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND EFFECTIVENESS: TOWARD AN ETHICALLY
RESPONSIBLE MODEL?
The House of Commons Health Committee Report and the associated
reforms and policy changes adopted by the MHRA, together with the ongoing
enhancement by the PMCPA to its code of practice, have had a reformative
impact on the behavior of drug companies operating in Britain, though it is
difficult to assess precisely the aggregate impact on industry promotion and
marketing practices. The British regulatory environment appears less
confrontational than the prevailing system in the United States. This may reflect
differences in the underlying political dynamic, in which government officials in
Britain are more readily willing to engage with industry and more apt to
recognize the contributions that the pharmaceutical industry has made to the
economic prosperity and public health of the citizenry.1
54
A number of UK industry executives conveyed in informal discussions that
their companies have significantly restricted policies related to sales, marketing,
and medical education policies since 2005 in response to the changed
http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/files/2005_AugustReview.pdf. The applicable regulatory submission
included clinical data from a range of combination treatments, though the panel expressed concerns
about Pierre Fabre's effective promotion of an oncology treatment developed by Roche since the
approved labeling of the Roche product specified combination use only with two other named
products. Id. at 59, 61.
154. At one point, British Prime Minister Tony Blair described the pharmaceutical industry as
"a prime example of what is needed in a successful knowledge economy" along with praising the
industry for its "very substantial contribution to our economy and welfare of our citizens."
Corporate Watch, The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI),
http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=332 (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). It is difficult to conceive of a
senior American official or member of Congress uttering similar sentiments.
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environment.' 55 More specifically, companies recently have modified policies
and practices in response to PMCPA panel decisions in areas such as the
provision of bonus payments, the awarding of unconditional medical grants, and
the need to distinctly separate promotional activities from the provision of
medical and educational goods and services.
156
Not surprisingly, American drug and device firms also have changed their
practices in the face of an ad hoc hostile enforcement environment. For example,
companies have limited the range of physicians to whom they detail their
products, they have curtailed or limited strictly the discretion held by individual
sales representatives to engage physicians in broader discussions about their
patients and treatment options, and they have changed compensation schemes to
reduce or eliminate incentive pay stemming from off-label prescribing.
In the short run, this environment does not seem likely to change. There will
continue to be regular announcements of civil settlements with staggering
financial penalties and criminal plea agreements with individual charges for
155. Interviews conducted with pharmaceutical company executives from various firms in the
United Kingdom between April and June, 2008, including those at GlaxoSmithKline, AstraZeneca,
and Merck Serono. More than one executive working in Great Britain for a multi-national
pharmaceutical company emphasized that self-regulation is effective largely because the APBI has
been willing to suspend company membership in the case of flagrant abuse. See supra note 128.
APBI membership is important for firms since the Association negotiates with the government of
the United Kingdom to obtain price approvals for new products and modifications for existing ones
156. See, e.g., Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Auth., CASE AUTH/1186/5/O1,
Anonymous v Pfizer, CODE PRAC. REv., Feb. 2002, at 10, 29, available at
http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/files/2002 Februaryreview.pdf#page= 10 (holding that so-called
medical liaison executives were too closely linked to the sales force, and should not be
communicating with physicians during pre-license approval time period); Prescription Medicines
Code of Practice Auth., CASES AUTH/1807/3/06 and AUTH/1810/3/06, The Sunday
Times/Director and a General Practitioner v Pfizer, CODE PRAc. REv., Nov. 2006, at 3, available
at http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/files/1807 and 1810_November.pdf#page=l (describing allegations
that payment to sponsored service providers cannot be linked to specific level of product sales or
receive bonuses based on product sales); Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Auth., Case
A UTH/1859/6/06, Anonymous Employees v Merck Sharp & Dohme, CODE PRAC. REv., Feb. 2007,
at 15, 16, available at http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/files/1859 Feb 2007.pdfffpage=l (company return
on investment calculations were alleged inconsistent with the concept of unrestricted grants, need
to have procedures to ensure funds spent for valid purposes); Prescription Medicines Code of
Practice Auth., CASES A UTH/1902/10/06 and A UTH/1903/10/06, Employee v Sanofi-Aventis and
Procter & Gamble, CODE PRAc. REv., Nov. 2007, at 3, 34, available at
http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/files/2007%20November%20Review.pdf (challenging company-funded
nurse audit program as too closely linked to promotion of the underlying product to treat
osteoporosis).
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executives likely. However, perpetuating this trend is untenable over the long
term, particularly when the rules are not clear, there are significant individual and
institutional political biases at work, and the outcomes are inconsistent. While the
promotional and financial excesses of pharmaceutical companies in recent years
cannot be excused, it is especially troubling that companies seeking to act in an
ethically responsible manner cannot find substantial clarity in existing law and
regulations. In turn, this lack of clarity raises an important constitutional
dimension when measuring the law's requirements for specificity against the
potential for criminal judgments under the strict liability framework of the
FDCA.'57
The critical question is how best to motivate companies to behave ethically
in adopting sound policies, exercising self-restraint in their business practices,
and engaging in self-policing under an effective compliance program. Based
upon field research interviews with government and private sector officials, as
well as a review of the pattern of panel cases brought in the past few years, the
British system appears to be working effectively to allow for the dissemination of
truthful, non-misleading information under appropriate circumstances while
significantly enhancing clarity and transparency. 58 Admittedly, empirical
analysis would be useful in refining our understanding of the British model and
its role in encouraging compliant policies and practices in the United Kingdom.
157. See George Terwilliger, former U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen., Address at the American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: Off-Label Uses of Approved Drugs: Medicine,
Law, and Policy (May 21, 2008) (criticizing the application of the exclusionary rule and current
DOJ policy and practice). An illustrative case involves three former executives of Purdue Pharma,
under which they were compelled to plead guilty to personal misdemeanors under a strict vicarious
liability theory in which their service as "responsible corporate officers" made them individually
liable for the alleged misdeeds of the corporation in making false claims related to its OxyContin
opioid painkiller medicine. See Barry Meier, 3 Officials Are Sentenced In Case Involving
OxyContin, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2007, at C4; Barry Meier, Narcotic Maker Guilty of Deceit over
Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2007, at Al.
158. As suggested above, these cases typically arise in the context of whether or not the
conveyance of truthful scientific and medical information constitutes promotion. See, e.g.,
Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Auth., CASE AUTH/JIO/JI/O0, Abbott v Roche, CODE
PRAc. REV., May 2001, at 22, available at http://72.47.199.56/files/2001_Mayreview.pdf;
Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Auth., Completed Cases, CASE AUTH/2234/5/09-Lilly v
Novo Nordisk, Interim Case Report, http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/?q=node/750 (last visited Apr. 21,
2010) (company may provide truthful scientific information about an unapproved drug to current
and potential clinical investigators, especially if grant of marketing authorization is not imminent).
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There is much to absorb from the regulatory approach of our colleagues in
Britain. Beginning with the development and adoption of reforms in 2005, there
has been evident substantial collaboration between the government and the
private sector. The embrace of regulatory strictures by British executives has
precipitated changes in company policies and business practices and a
concomitant rise in reputation, thereby further reinforcing industry's commitment
to the process. This is not a panacea; PMCPA proceedings make clear that some
companies in Britain continue to break the rules, and their employees and those
of rivals continue to complain about improper promotional practices. However,
in such cases these complaints are presented, confronted, investigated, and
resolved efficiently, transparently, and effectively without criminal exposure and
excessive cost.
It is unrealistic politically to imagine the wholesale importation of the
British approach to regulating off-label promotion. Among other things, America
lacks the tradition and experience of decades of private, self-regulation of
advertising and promotion. However, the United States would do well to consider
modifying its approach such that it better achieves the efficiency and
transparency now prevailing in the United Kingdom. Our public policy should
support the sound practice of medicine without restricting the prerogative of
physicians to make decisions. Granted, government oversight is necessary on
some level to ensure that firms provide consistently accurate and balanced
information about their products when profits and sales commissions are at issue.
But our current system, which is based on the precept that a paternalistic FDA is
uniquely situated to shield consumers and doctors from the vulgar commercial
motivations of industry, is grossly unbalanced. We must trust academic
physicians and practicing doctors to digest and evaluate medical and scientific
information as it becomes available.
What should be done to address this imbalance? First and foremost, the FDA
should adopt new regulations that eliminate ambiguity and provide clear
guidance as to company behavior in each of the areas in which pharmaceutical
companies interact with physicians and payers: consulting agreements,
continuing medical education, internet and electronic media postings,
reimbursement information, sales representative promotional messages, and the
permissible activities of medical liaison and medical affairs. These areas can and
should be addressed just as the FDA did early in 2009 when it adopted its final
rule on the dissemination of peer-reviewed journal articles. 59 Moreover, the
159. See Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical
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pharmaceutical industry could work with the agency to develop jointly a code of
conduct that embraces these principles. 160 While there likely will be disagreement
as to the restrictions on speech associated with these commercial activities, many
companies are so anxious for clarity that they would be willing to accept a
Faustian bargain that embraces certainty in lieu of autonomy. Second, HHS
should reassert its prerogative and wrest control from the DOJ of off-label
enforcement actions. As described in this article, the DOJ has the authority and
responsibility to prosecute and threaten the prosecution for criminal matters, and
the FDCA includes criminal sanctions for violating its statutory provisions. I am
suggesting a subtle shift in the government's perspective, such that HHS and the
FDA have the authority to address cases as they develop, and referral to the DOJ
for criminal investigation is reserved for those egregious cases that, based upon
the FDA's understanding of the drug and company in question, present
significant malfeasance. Regulatory enforcement must minimize the likelihood of
disseminating untruthful and misleading information, but unless companies are
found to have intentionally misled physicians or the public and caused injury or
damage to health, violations should be treated as civil regulatory infractions and
not criminal offenses. Accordingly, one alternative to the present criminal
enforcement approach would be to establish significant, statutory civil penalties
for the dissemination of false or misleading information. This scheme could
establish a legal presumption in favor of liability based upon some showing by
the government or private plaintiffs that could then be rebutted by the accused
company. One might consider as well an enforcement panel operated by the OIG,
with medical, legal, and policy input from the FDA, that metes out civil liability
penalties in a streamlined process reminiscent of that used by Britain's PMCPA.
Third, as others have suggested, 161 the FDA could provide incentives or mandates
to compel companies to conduct clinical studies and submit data to the agency
for review prior to speaking about it. Fourth, Congress should increase its
appropriations for the FDA to allow the agency to more effectively and
efficiently review supplemental New Drug Applications for expanded
indications. In turn, the FDA should consider developing an expedited process
that would allow new indications to be approved without the same extent of
clinical testing currently required for NDAs. Fifth, while I recognize that many
support using the federal False Claims Act to provide an incentive for
or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved
or Cleared Medical Devices; Availability, 74 Fed. Reg. 1,694.
160. See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS OF AM., CODE ON INTERACTIONS
WITH HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS, supra note 128.
161. See Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened
Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476 (2009).
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whistleblowers in the health care arena, my experience leads me to believe that
Congress should evaluate the wisdom of applying this statute to off-label
promotion cases, as it has created a vehicle for current and former employees to
ignore the in-house compliance process and go directly to the government in
pursuit of extraordinary wealth.
IX. CONCLUSION
In the end, public policy should create incentives for self-reform and ethical
corporate behavior. Rather than destroying our research-based drug companies
by applying the "death penalty, 162 of debarment, a far better outcome for society
would follow if the companies that are responsible for much of the innovation
that drives our future health and well-being are allowed to "reform
themselves."1 63 Companies must adopt and enforce rigorous compliance policies
and programs, and more than that, must act in a meticulous, ethical manner when
speaking about products for human health. Pharmaceutical company executives
must be brutally honest with themselves, their various stakeholders, and other
third parties as they evaluate clinical and medical data. In many cases, this may
require extensive consultation with medical experts in the field, and the timely
publication of comprehensive summaries of all relevant product information.
Above all, they must act with the highest levels of integrity in their relationships
with physicians and patients so as to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.
This kind of responsible behavior will be reinforced by the fair application of
clear rules.
Each of the stakeholders in this area should reflect on their respective
interests and values. Industry leaders must develop a greater degree of genuine
respect for government regulators and policymakers and must operate their firms
with integrity. At the same time, government policy makers should recognize that
if we transform the research-based pharmaceutical and biomedical device
industries into the functional equivalent of public utilities, we will have cheaper
medicine and technology in the short run but not much in the way of new
medicine or technology in the long run. Physicians need to consider whether they
value the products, medical education, and information provided by drug
companies, and if they do, break their lengthy silence on this issue. Patients,
whether suffering from rare diseases or otherwise, should serve as advocates for
the products that they believe are vital to their health, even if the use happens to
162. See supra note 84.
163. John Simons, Why Do Drug Companies Fear This Man?, FORTUNE, Oct. 27, 2003, at 167
(quoting Michael Sullivan, then-United States Attorney for the District of Massachusetts).
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be off-label.
These developments will not transform the present environment in the near
term. There are substantial political forces at work and there is substantial
momentum in favor of continued regulation by threat of prosecution as
companies scramble to reform their practices in light of evolving government
policy. Perhaps the Supreme Court ultimately will hear the Allergan case and
will rule that those FDA regulations prohibiting companies from speaking about
truthful scientific and medical information are unconstitutional. Absent this,
policy makers and regulators might regard favorably the British model of private,
self-regulation combined with meaningful, effective government regulatory
oversight. While empirical work undertaken over a longer time frame would be
useful to validate this conclusion, substantial anecdotal evidence suggests that the
UK approach has succeeded in curtailing many of the very same troubling
promotional and marketing practices by many of the very same companies in a
fair and expeditious manner. It is time for America to learn something from the
old country.
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